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ABSTRACT
Stream processing emerged as a paradigm to continuously process incoming
live data streams, such as audio, video, and business feeds. These applica-
tions are assembled as dataflow graphs, where each vertex of the graph is
a stream operator and each edge is a stream connection. In this environ-
ment, a fault in a stream operator can result in massive data loss or in the
generation of inaccurate results. Most of the fault tolerance solutions pro-
posed for streaming applications aim at guaranteeing that no data is lost
or that no data item is delivered to the application more than once. These
techniques result in high performance overhead, given the need to coordi-
nate the state stored in checkpoints of distributed components or maintain
consistency between replicas. In this dissertation, we investigate partial fault
tolerance methods, which protect only the most critical stream operators
of a streaming application. These methods take advantage of the fact that
stream processing algorithms are approximate by nature and, as a result,
can still achieve acceptable results under data loss and duplicate data deliv-
ery. The methods proposed in this dissertation include a checkpoint-based
mechanism and a partial graph replication technique. Both techniques were
implemented in System S, IBM Research’s stream processing middleware. In
addition, this dissertation describes two different fault tolerance evaluation
techniques. The first technique is based on fault injection and is used to em-
ulate the effects of partial fault tolerance on a streaming application. With
the fault injection results, the developers can understand the impact of faults
on the application output and identify the most critical operators on their
streaming application. The second evaluation technique is a model-based
framework which provides generic abstractions for representing streaming
applications with the stochastic activity network formalism. The framework
allows the comparison of different fault tolerance techniques under varying
fault models. Based on the results, the developers can evaluate the trade-offs
that a certain technique provides when applied to their target application.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Stream processing is a paradigm to analyze live streaming data, such as au-
dio, sensor readings, and news feeds. Traditional solutions for data analysis,
such as database management systems (DBMSs), are usually not suitable
for the extremely high rates of data streams. DBMSs execute queries that
have exact answers over the stored data. Stream-oriented applications con-
tinuously query data that arrives asynchronously and compute answers over
incomplete information [1, 2]. Examples of streaming applications include
fraud detection [3], financial applications [4], network monitoring [5, 6], sys-
tem anomaly prediction [7, 8], road traffic monitoring [9, 10, 11], analysis of
geophysical events [12, 13], and sensor-based patient monitoring [14].
Streaming applications process continuous live data, making high-
availability a key requirement [15]. Developers build streaming applications
by assembling stream operators as dataflow graphs, which can be distributed
over a set of nodes to achieve high performance and scalability. A failure in
a computing node or in the stream operator itself can result in massive loss
of data or in a delayed application output. On one hand, large amounts of
data loss can lead to imprecise results. On the other hand, in a number of
streaming applications, it may be better to produce partial results within a
time bound than to produce complete results too late [16].
Most fault tolerance techniques for stream computing [17, 18, 19, 20, 21]
consider that no stream data can be lost or duplicated, and the state of
replicas of the same component should not diverge. This assumption results
in extra overhead in the communication substrate, decreasing the overall
system throughput [22]. In systems with high throughput and real-time
requirements, resources should be allocated with parsimony. Fault tolerance
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techniques that enforce no data loss and duplication under failures have a
high impact on the performance of a streaming application, which can become
unaffordable if we consider the data rates projected for the coming years [23].
Moreover, in this scenario, it is not necessary to ensure such semantics in
order to achieve correctness under failure events. The rationale is that many
streaming applications tolerate data imprecision by design, and, as a result,
can still achieve correctness with data loss and duplication. Techniques for
handling streaming systems that are operating over their load capacity also
take advantage of this application characteristic. In overload situations, the
system sheds its load by randomly dropping stream data items [24, 25, 26].
1.2 Goals
The first goal of this dissertation is to protect a streaming application against
faults with methods that have low performance and resource overhead but
still achieve correctness under the occurrence of faults. By providing config-
urable fault tolerance approaches, the developers can tune the fault tolerance
solution specifically for their application and pay performance and resource
overheads only for the parts of the stream processing graph that are neces-
sary. The second goal of this work is to provide experimental and model-
based methods to evaluate the impact of faults on the application output
when a specific fault tolerance technique is applied. With such methods, the
developers can understand how faults can affect their applications, compare
the trade-offs between different techniques, and decide how to better deploy
fault tolerance in their applications.
1.3 Contributions
The main contributions of this research can be summarized as follows.
1. Partial fault tolerance techniques for streaming applications, which allow
the application developer to selectively apply fault tolerance mechanisms to
the stream processing graph [27]. The techniques are deployed via language
level annotations. As a result, only applications that need a given protection
pay for the incurred performance overhead. Applying techniques directly on
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the stream processing system middleware decreases the system throughput
for all applications, even for the ones that do not require such protection.
We developed specialized checkpointing and partial graph replication tech-
niques that do not strictly enforce that a stream data item should not be lost
or duplicated (i.e., duplicate delivery of the same data item), avoiding high
cost protocols in the communication substrate used between the stream op-
erators of a streaming application. These techniques favor performance and
application output timeliness over precise computation of every output data
item. Both techniques were implemented and evaluated over Spade (Stream
Processing Application Declarative Engine) [28]. Spade is the declarative
stream processing language that is part of System S, IBM Research’s stream
processing middleware [3, 29, 30, 31, 32] and basis for IBM’s commercial
stream processing solution InfoSphere Streams [33, 34]. Parts of the de-
veloped checkpointing techniques are included in the InfoSphere Streams
Version 1.2 distribution [35]. This feature has been used in real streaming
applications, such as the checkpointing of bloom filter data structures used
to detect duplicate incoming call detail records1.
2. An experimental evaluation methodology tailored to streaming applica-
tions, which is based on injecting faults into different stream operators and
observing the fault’s effect on the application output quality. This method-
ology helps the developers to assess if the chosen fault tolerance technique
is adequate for their application and to identify which stream operators are
the most critical for the application to maintain quality of service.
In short, the proposed methodology emulates the effect of a fault in a
streaming application when a specific fault tolerance mechanism is in place.
The method uses a user-defined output score function to measure the appli-
cation output quality under faults and then uses this function to compute
four metrics that characterize the behavior of individual stream operators
under faults. The proposed evaluation metrics are the outage duration im-
pact, the data dependency, the recovery time, and the quality impact. We
demonstrate this methodology by injecting a bursty data loss fault model in
a financial engineering streaming application [4]. Our results confirm that
faults affecting different stream operators quite differently impact the appli-
cation output quality, demonstrating that operator sensitivity to faults can
1A call detail record contains data related to a telephone exchange.
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be used to deploy partial fault tolerance techniques.
3. A framework for model-based evaluation of fault tolerance techniques
applied to streaming applications, which allows the evaluation of trade-offs
of different techniques and under varying fault models. Our framework is
based on three key abstractions: stream operators, stream connections, and
tuples. By composing these abstractions within a stochastic activity network
(SAN) [36], we allow the modeling and evaluation of complete streaming
applications.
The evaluation framework considers faults that lead to data loss and to
silent data corruption (SDC). Importantly, the model captures the error be-
havior of these two failure modes by retrofitting the behavior observed in
real fault injection experiments into the model. The model also captures
how faults originating in one operator propagate to other operators down
the stream processing graph. Finally, one of the unique aspects of the pro-
posed framework is the evaluation of the application through the combination
of the effects of faults on application data and its state.
We demonstrate the extensibility of our framework by evaluating the im-
pact of faults when three different fault tolerance techniques are applied:
checkpointing, partial graph replication, and full graph replication [22]. Our
study shows that under crashes that lead to data loss, partial graph repli-
cation has a great advantage in maintaining the accuracy of the application
output when compared to checkpointing. We also show that silent data
corruption can break the no data duplication guarantees of a full graph
replication-based fault tolerance technique.
1.4 Dissertation Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes
related work on the area of stream processing systems. Chapter 3 describes
the design of the checkpointing technique, language extensions to Spade
and application output accuracy and performance experiments. Chapter 4
describes the experimental evaluation methodology, the proposed evaluation
metrics, and an experiment conducted with a financial engineering applica-
tion. Chapter 5 describes our modeling framework, detailing the application
model and its mapping to the SAN formalism. This chapter also includes
4
a description of the partial graph replication technique. Finally, Chapter 6
concludes this dissertation and proposes future work.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
This chapter describes research related to this dissertation. First, we intro-
duce the nomenclature related to stream processing applications. Sections
2.2 and 2.3 show an overview of current middleware and languages for de-
ploying streaming applications. Finally, Section 2.4 reports on fault tolerance
techniques designed specifically for streaming applications.
2.1 Nomenclature
As described in Chapter 1, streaming applications aim at extracting knowl-
edge from live data sources online. To achieve this objective, these applica-
tions are organized as dataflow graphs, where a node processes the incoming
data, and sends it to the next node in the graph. Figure 2.1 shows the
nomenclature associated with these applications, which is used throughout
this dissertation.
stream source upstream set
op1
op2
op3
op4
op5 op6stream operator
stream
connection
tuples
sink
sources
downstream set
op1 op3
op5 op6
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
sink
op2 op4
Application represented as a graph
Figure 2.1: Nomenclature associated with a stream processing application.
• Stream source - a stream data source is a device that generates data
that is of interest to a given application. The application connects to
the stream source, which periodically forwards the available data to
be processed by the flow graph. Examples of a stream source include
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sensors [37] and servers hosting user-generated content (e.g., Twitter
[38, 39] and Facebook [40] feeds).
• Sink - a sink is a component that stores, displays, or forwards the data
produced by the application. Examples of a sink are a database or a
user interface that shows the processing results in real-time.
• Stream operator - receives data from its input streams and executes a
function over the incoming data item. Depending on the semantics of
the function (i.e., operator type), it may send out a data item to the
next operator. Examples of stream operators are filter, window-based
aggregate [41], window-based join [41], barrier, and union.
• Stream connection - interconnects and transmits data items between
different stream operators. If stream operators reside in the same pro-
cess of an operating system [28, 42], stream connections can be imple-
mented as a producer-consumer data structure. If operators reside in
different nodes of a distributed system, stream connections can be im-
plemented via inter-node communication protocols (e.g., TCP, UDP).
• Tuples - a data item being processed by an operator or flowing through
a stream connection. A tuple has a finite number of attributes, and
each attribute has a value associated to it.
• Upstream set - the upstream set of a given operator is the set with all
other operators connected directly and indirectly (via another operator)
to its input streams (i.e., operators towards the stream source). In the
example depicted in Figure 2.1, the operators in the upstream set of
operator op5 are op3, op4, op1, and op2.
• Downstream set - the downstream set of a given operator is the set
with all other operators connected directly and indirectly to its output
streams (i.e., operators towards the sink). In Figure 2.1, the operators
in the downstream set of operator op4 are op5 and op6.
A formal model of a streaming application is given in Chapter 5.
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2.2 Stream Processing Systems
Many stream processing systems have been developed in past years, both in
academia and in industry. One of the first attempts to build a stream pro-
cessing engine was the Aurora project [43], developed at Brandeis University,
Brown University, and MIT. Aurora allows the developer to build streaming
applications by composing a flow graph by interconnecting different opera-
tors. The flow graphs can consume data from both live data streams and
historical data (e.g., DBMS). The original Aurora prototype focused on exe-
cuting the dataflows in a single node. In contrast with Aurora, Medusa [44]
aimed at composing applications where the resources (e.g., stream sources,
sinks) can be geographically distributed. Both systems later evolved into the
Borealis stream processing engine [45]. Borealis uses the same application
model as Aurora, but improves on it by allowing the operator graph to be dis-
tributed in several nodes. In addition, it allows dynamic query modification,
so that the operator logic can be adjusted during application runtime.
TelegraphCQ [46] is another academic project related to stream processing.
It was developed at the University of California, Berkeley. TelegraphCQ was
developed on top of the PostgreSQL relational database [47]. It adds new
constructs to SQL in order to allow development of continuous queries. The
first prototype of TelegraphCQ focused on a multi-threaded implementation
instead of a distributed version.
More recent academic approaches for processing live data streams include
StreamMine [48] and MapReduce Online [49]. StreamMine, developed at the
Technische Universita¨t Dresden, aims at supporting distributed stream pro-
cessing applications. It uses a software transactional memory infrastructure
to allow speculation when operators process parallel events. MapReduce
Online was developed at the University of California, Berkeley, and is an
adaptation of the original MapReduce paradigm [50] to support continuous
queries. The main difference between this implementation and other data
stream processing systems is that it uses buffers to send the output of a map
task to a reduce task. Data from the map task to the reduce task are only
transmitted after the buffer is full, increasing the processing latency.
Industry initiatives include Microsoft StreamInsight [51, 52], Stream-
base [53], Sybase Alery Streaming Platform [54], and IBM Research’s System
S [3, 29, 30, 31, 32]. The next section discusses the architecture of System
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S, which was the middleware used to test the fault tolerance methods and
evaluation techniques proposed in this dissertation.
2.2.1 IBM System S
IBM System S is a distributed stream processing system that aims at running
large-scale streaming applications. One of its characteristics is to be non-
transactional, since it does not have atomicity or durability guarantees. This
is typical in stream processing systems where applications are continuously
running and quickly producing results.
In System S, independent executions of an application with the same in-
put may generate different outputs. There are two main reasons for this
non-determinism. First, stream operators often consume data from multiple
inputs (e.g., op5 in Figure 2.1). If the data transport subsystem does not
enforce message ordering across data coming from different sources, there
is no guarantee in terms of which message the operator will consume first.
Second, operators can use time-based windows. Some stream operators (e.g.,
aggregate and join) produce output based on the data within specified win-
dow boundaries. For example, if a programmer declares a window which
accumulates data over 20 seconds, there is no guarantee that two different
runs receive the same amount of data in the defined time interval.
System S deploys each application as a job. A job is composed of multiple
processing elements (PEs), which are containers for the operators that make
up an application dataflow graph. A PE is mapped to a process running
on top of an operating system. PEs can be placed in any node available
to the System S runtime infrastructure. Each PE hosts one or more stream
operators. Stream operators are fused into the same PE when the cost of
processing a tuple locally is smaller than sending it via the network [42, 28,
55]. Figure 2.2 shows a possible deployment of the sample application in
Figure 2.1 when running on top of System S. In this example, operators op1
and op3 are fused into the same PE and are running in a different node from
the other operators of the processing graph.
Figure 2.3 shows the simplified architecture of the System S infrastructure.
To run a given job, the user contacts the job manager (JMN) [31, 56], which
is responsible for dispatching the PEs to remote nodes. The JMN contacts a
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op3op1
node
processing
element op6op5
op4op2
Operators may be placed in the same process and in the same node.
Figure 2.2: Deployment of a streaming application running on System S.
resource manager (RMN) to check for available nodes in the system. Then,
JMN contacts the master node controller (MNC) on the remote nodes, which
instantiates the PEs locally. Once the PEs are running, the stream processing
core (SPC) [29, 30] is responsible for carrying out the stream connections
and transporting tuples between PEs. The dataflow graph manager (DGM)
guides the SPC by informing which PEs should be connected to each other.
The SPC also transports data between PEs. The storage subsystem is a
shared file system accessible to all nodes.
Job Manager
(JMN)
Master Node 
Controller
(MNC)
Stream 
Processing 
Core
(SPC)
PE
Resource Manager
(RMN)
Storage
subsystem Dataflow Graph Manager(DGM)
PE PE
Master Node 
Controller
(MNC)
Stream 
Processing 
Core
(SPC)
PE PE PE
SAN LAN
Figure 2.3: System S architecture.
This dissertation focuses on the fault tolerance of streaming applications.
The proposed fault tolerance methods are implemented directly into stream
operator code and into their support libraries (Chapter 3). The problem of
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fault tolerance in infrastructure components of a stream processing middle-
ware and its validation is tackled in our earlier work [31, 56].
2.3 Stream Processing Languages
Many high-level languages have been developed in the past few years that
target stream processing applications. They aim at providing the user direct
abstractions that fit the stream paradigm and facilitate the development of
streaming applications. Examples of such abstractions are the representation
of a stream and the ability to express time-based operations.
CQL [57], StreamSQL [58], GSQL [59], and ESL [60] are SQL-like lan-
guages that allow the development of continuous queries by defining streams
and allowing a variety of windowing semantics. The motivation for a SQL
variation comes from its widespread use for querying relational databases.
Once the users submit their continuous queries, the stream processing system
generates a representation of the queries as dataflow graphs, which express
how the operators send data to each other. Once the operators start con-
suming data from stream sources, the application starts producing results.
Another set of languages allows composing a streaming application directly
as a graph. One example is the Aurora system, which provides a way for the
developer to assemble the application by connecting boxes and arrows [43].
StreamIt [61] is a programming language developed at MIT which allows the
composition of graphs by using the following three types of operator inter-
connection patterns: pipeline, split-join, and feedback loop. StreamIt gives
freedom to the programmers to specify their own logic for each stream op-
erator. Spade [28] is the language and compiler for creating distributed
data stream processing applications to be deployed on IBM’s System S. In
Chapter 3, we show how we extended Spade to support the fault tolerance
methods proposed in this dissertation. The next section describes the struc-
ture of Spade and its main features.
2.3.1 Spade
Spade [28] is a language and a compiler for creating distributed data stream
processing applications to be deployed on System S. Spade offers (i) a lan-
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guage for flexible composition of parallel and distributed dataflow graphs; (ii)
a toolkit of type-generic built-in stream processing operators; (iii) an exten-
sible operator framework, which supports the addition of new type-generic
and configurable operators (user-defined built-in operators [UBOPs]) to the
language, as well as new user-defined non-generic operators (user-defined op-
erators [UDOPs]) used to wrap existing, possibly legacy analytics; and (iv)
a broad range of edge adapters used to ingest data from outside sources and
publish data to outside destinations, such as network sockets, databases, and
file systems.
The Spade language provides a stream-centric, operator-based program-
ming model. The stream-centric design implies a programming language
where an application writer can quickly translate the flows of data from a
block diagram prototype into the application skeleton by simply listing the
stream dataflows. The second aspect, i.e., operator-based programming, is
focused on designing the application by considering the smallest possible
building blocks that are necessary to deliver the computation an application
has to perform. In summary, Spade programs are dataflow graphs, where
operators are connected via streams and serve as basic computational units
performing stream transformations. Each stream follows a defined schema,
which can be built from Spade basic types (e.g., integer, string). All tuples
going through a stream follow the schema defined for that stream.
Figure 2.4 shows a sample application written in Spade. This
application uses as a stream source the error log produced by host
targetHost.crhc.illinois.edu. The data from the stream source is
fetched to the application via a source (Source) operator, which then pro-
duces a Log stream. The Log stream is consumed by two other functor
(Functor) operators. These two operators filter the incoming events by
the value of the eventPriority attribute. The first functor produces the
InfoEvents stream, which contains events with priority INFO. The second
functor filters events with priority ALERT and produces an AlertEvents
stream. This stream is consumed by a UDOP (Udop), which sends an email
to the host administrator notifying the alert. After the UDOP processes
the event, it forwards the event to the Sink operator, which stores a copy
of the event in a local file called AlertEvents.log. Events related to the
InfoEvents stream are stored into the InfoEvents.log file. The equivalent
flow graph of this application is shown in Figure 2.5, where each Spade op-
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erator maps into a box. In this figure, the boxes are labeled according to
the output stream it produces or the operator type (Sink operator). Note,
however, that Spade associate names to streams and not to operators.
stream Log(dateTime: String, eventPriority: String,
eventMessage: String)
:= Source()
["ctcp://targetHost.crhc.illinois.edu:9876/"]{}
stream InfoEvents(dateTime: String, eventMessage: String)
:= Functor(Log)[eventPriority = "INFO"]{}
stream AlertEvents(dateTime: String, eventMessage: String)
:= Functor(Log)[eventPriority = "ALERT"]{}
stream SendEmailAdmin(dateTime: String, eventMessage: String)
:= Udop(AlertEvents)[]{}
Nil := Sink(SendEmailAdmin)["file:///AlertEvents.log"]{}
Nil := Sink(InfoEvents)["file:///InfoEvents.log"]{}
Figure 2.4: Sample Spade code for a log processing application.
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Figure 2.5: Corresponding dataflow graph for a log processing application.
A key distinction between Spade and other stream processing middle-
ware is its emphasis on code generation. Given an application specification
in the Spade language, the Spade compiler generates specialized applica-
tion code based on the computation and communication capabilities of the
runtime environment. This specialization includes many aspects, such as
rate-adaptiveness [62] and code fusion [42, 55]. In this dissertation, we take
advantage of Spade’s code generation capability to generate specialized fault
tolerance algorithms.
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2.4 Fault Tolerance for Stream Processing Applications
A number of fault tolerance techniques target streaming applications. In this
dissertation, we classify them into the following two categories: (i) stringent,
where the fault tolerance method aims to guarantee that no tuple is lost and
that no tuple is duplicated ; and (ii) partial, where the fault tolerance tech-
nique allows tuple loss and tuple duplication under faults. These techniques
favor performance over a no-data-loss and no-data-duplication guarantee.
The techniques presented in this dissertation fall into the partial category.
2.4.1 Stringent Fault Tolerance Techniques
Shah et al. [20] present Flux, a variant of the process-pair technique [63].
To avoid tuple loss and duplication, the technique proposes the addition of
special ingress and egress operators, which help to ensure message delivery,
message ordering, and failover between replicated operators. This approach
requires stream operators to be deterministic and replicated operators to
receive all tuples in the same order.
Balazinska et al. [17, 64] propose a protocol called DPC (delay, process
and correct). DPC aims to achieve both availability and result consistency.
To reduce the processing latency upon the occurrence of a failure, DPC
allows stream operators to produce tentative tuples. These tentative tuples
are corrected once the failed component recovers. Similarly to Flux, DPC
requires operators to be deterministic.
Hwang et al. [65] describe three techniques for high-availability in stream-
ing applications: (i) passive standby, (ii) active standby, and (iii) upstream
backup. In the passive standby approach, operators checkpoint their internal
state and communication queues to a backup replica. In active standby, the
backup replica actively processes tuples. The output tuples produced by the
replica are logged, so they can be replayed in case of a failure. Upstream
backup uses the upstream nodes as backups for the downstream neighbors
by preserving tuples in their output queues until their downstream neigh-
bors have processed them. In these schemes, the communication substrate
is modified to coordinate which tuples should be present in checkpoints (if
any) and in input/output queues of other operators in the system.
Cai et al. [66] propose a hybrid approach for maintaining backup repli-
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cas. In this technique, replicas are brought up-to-date periodically. The
frequency of the checkpoint increases when a system monitor predicts a fail-
ure. Similarly to the approaches proposed in [65], this technique checkpoints
the internal operator state and logs the outgoing tuples.
SGuard [19] provide fault tolerance for streaming applications via check-
pointing. The application checkpoints are saved to disk using a distributed
and replicated file system. SGuard provides a memory management mid-
dleware, which uses application-level copy-on-write to perform asynchronous
checkpointing. The application developer uses specialized classes that allow
the memory management middleware to transparently checkpoint the appli-
cation state. Like previous approaches, SGuard checkpoints the internal data
structures of each operator and logs input/output tuples in case they need
to be replayed after a crash.
Hwang et al. [22] describe a full replication technique that allows each op-
erator to receive inputs from replicated dataflows. In this technique, both
operator replicas are active and de-duplicate data items coming from re-
dundant streams. For de-duplication of tuples, the operator implementation
logic is modified so that replicas can work in a deterministic fashion. In
Chapter 5, we use the modeling framework proposed in this dissertation to
provide the evaluation of this technique when faults leading to silent data
corruption occur.
StreamMine provides two methods for fault tolerance. The first is based
on checkpointing [67]. In this approach, the operator checkpoints internal
states and logs non-deterministic events to allow precise replay upon a re-
covery. The second approach is based on active replication [68]. Replicated
operators can be single or multi-threaded. In this implementation, the com-
munication substrate uses an atomic broadcast protocol to deliver messages
to the replicas. The time spent on achieving consensus is overlapped with
processing time by using speculative processing of tuples.
In [69], Gu et al. propose the sweeping checkpoint method. This technique
checkpoints the internal state and the output queues of operators. It trig-
gers the checkpoint after receiving acknowledge messages from downstream
operators. Zhang et al. [70] use the same checkpoint method to deploy a hy-
brid fault tolerance technique, which combines passive and active operator
replicas.
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2.4.2 Partial Fault Tolerance Techniques
Besides stringent fault tolerance techniques, Hwang et al. [65] also mention
the use of an amnesia technique. This technique does not save any data
related to operator state and input/output communication queues. Their
work does not evaluate the impact of such techniques on the application
output, which is the focus of Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation.
Murty and Welsh [71] enumerate fault tolerance techniques that can be
used for applications that process live data. One such technique is structured
operator replication, which replicates operators that are considered important
to the query. One example of replication criteria is the depth of the operator
in the flow graph. Another technique is free-running operators, which does
not require operators to be in strict consistency. The authors do not discuss
the evaluation of the proposed techniques or the fault tolerance deployment
criteria.
LSS [21] (lightweight summary structure) is a checkpointing technique for
streaming applications. The authors describe stream operators as having the
following behavior: read data from streams, process data, and accumulate
intermediate results. The authors propose to save the state of the stream
operator at the end of each loop iteration. In this approach, tuples can be
lost during operator failure and recovery.
Zen [16] is a resource allocation framework for partial fault tolerant stream
processing applications. It considers the importance of operators and the fail-
ure characteristic of a given cluster to decide how to assign stream operators
to computing nodes. In Zen, it is assumed that the importance of a compo-
nent can be defined as a linear combination of the importance of its inputs.
Our fault injection experiments with a streaming application presented in
Chapter 4 show that this assumption does not necessarily hold.
2.5 Summary
This chapter summarizes research on the area of stream processing systems.
Both academic and industry research initiatives in this area are introduced.
In addition, the chapter details the architecture of IBM’s stream processing
middleware System S and its programming language Spade. Finally, fault
tolerance approaches for streaming applications are described. Additional
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comparisons between these techniques and those proposed in this dissertation
are included at the end of each chapter of this dissertation.
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Chapter 3
CHECKPOINTING FOR STREAM
PROCESSING APPLICATIONS
For streaming applications to generate semantically correct results, even in
the presence of failures, it is essential to employ fault tolerance techniques.
For instance, sensor-based patient monitoring applications require rigorous
fault tolerance, since data loss or computation errors may lead to catastrophic
results. On the other hand, there are applications that do not have such
strict requirements. One such example is an application that discovers pairs
of caller/callee by data-mining a set of VoIP streams [72]. In case of failures,
VoIP packets may be lost or a user can get disconnected from the VoIP
system. The application can still infer the caller/callee pairs, although with
less confidence. Such a class of applications is called partial fault tolerant.
Moreover, in some streaming applications it may be better to produce partial
results within a time bound than to produce complete results too late [16].
In systems that aim to provide maximum data throughput, resources must
be spent with parsimony. Therefore, one-size-fits-all fault tolerance is not
the best approach for streaming applications.
To achieve massive parallelism and scalability, stream processing systems
distribute the application over nodes in a cluster. Hence, they are subject to
the failure model of distributed systems [73], where messages can be omit-
ted, duplicated, nodes can crash, and the network can become partitioned.
A successful technique to provide fault tolerance to large-scale distributed
systems is synchronous checkpointing [74]. While it can be applicable to
streaming applications, more specialized approaches can be more appropri-
ate. A streaming application is one particular type of parallel application.
While the latter, in general, has clear synchronization points (barriers), the
former is constantly changing its state based on the incoming data. Addi-
tionally, a typical streaming application has real-time constraints. Stopping
the application to coordinate a checkpoint operation directly affects the tim-
ing requirements. Many fault tolerance techniques developed specifically for
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stream computing [19, 21, 65] do not consider the semantics of the application
and apply fault tolerance throughout the system. This results in unneces-
sary performance overhead and an overall degradation of performance when
contrasted with a more targeted approach.
In this chapter we describe the design of checkpointing techniques for par-
tial fault tolerant streaming applications. We deployed such techniques in
Spade and System S. To provide flexibility to the user, we do not enforce a
single checkpointing policy for the whole application. More specifically, we
allow the application developers to annotate their Spade application source
code, so that they can choose which parts of their application should be
fault tolerant. The use of language-level annotations is a natural approach
to specify such policies, since the developers know their application semantics
and failure behavior. To carry out the behavior chosen by the user, we take
advantage of Spade’s code generation framework to automatically produce
the extra code required by the fault tolerance policies.
The main contributions of the work described in this chapter are (i) a
framework for applying fault tolerance policies for streaming applications
via language annotations; (ii) an incremental checkpointing algorithm for
sliding window-based stream operators; and (iii) a code generator that out-
puts specialized checkpointing code based on the stream operator type and
instance.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 discusses
the behavior of System S under failures. Section 3.2 describes the check-
pointing techniques for user-defined operators and window-based operators.
Section 3.3 demonstrates the applicability and benefits of the technique and
includes several performance studies using a real-world manufacturing appli-
cation as well as synthetic applications. Section 3.4 compares the proposed
approach with previous research. Finally, Section 3.5 provides a summary of
the chapter.
3.1 System S under Failures
The System S middleware has many self-healing features. As a central com-
ponent, JMN plays a fundamental role in this. Besides dispatching PEs,
JMN also monitors their life-cycle. Each MNC monitors which PEs are alive
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in its local node and sends this information to JMN. If a PE fails, JMN de-
tects it and re-dispatches the PE in the same node. If the PE has crashed
due to a node failure, JMN may restart the PE in a different node. During
the recovery time, the behavior of the PEs connected to the crashed PE dif-
fers. The behavior depends on the specific position of the PE in the dataflow
graph, as it is shown by Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
Figure 3.1 shows an example of a graph with six PEs. PE 1 sends the
same data to PE 3 and PE 4. PE 4 also consumes data from PE 2. PE 5
and 6 consume data from PE 3 and 4, respectively. Figure 3.2 shows the
consequence of a failure in PE 4. As expected, PE 6 does not have input
streams to process; therefore, it does not produce any data. The behavior
differs for PE 1 and 2, since they are data producers (also referred to as source
PEs). SPC discards all the new data PE 2 sends, given that there is no PE
to consume it. PE 1 still has one live connection, so it continues to send new
data to PE 3, but it stops sending data to PE 4. Once PE 4 is reintegrated,
the connections are re-established. At this point, PE 2 stops discarding data
and PE 1 resumes sending new data to both links. More details on SPC and
System S failure behavior can be found in earlier work [29, 31, 56].
PE 1
PE 4 PE 6PE 2
PE 3 PE 5 PE 1
PE 4 PE 6PE 2
PE 3 PE 5
X
Figure 3.1: SPC normal behavior.
The operator fusion feature of Spade also has an important implication
for how applications can fail in System S. As described in Section 2.2.1, fusing
operators results in placing multiple operators inside a single PE. Instead of
using the regular stream transport, the streams are converted into function
calls [4]. Because all operators in a PE reside in a single process and share
the same address space, if an operator in the fused group crashes, the whole
set of operators hosted by a PE also crashes.
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X
Figure 3.2: SPC under PE failure.
3.2 Checkpoint Design
As described in Section 2.3.1, Spade has an operator-based programming
model. To checkpoint an operator, it is important to define the behavior
of the operator under failure and the state it should have once it recovers.
To minimize the performance overhead, we have to develop techniques that
are specific to individual operator types and that can be customizable by
different instances a developer might employ in the context of one applica-
tion. Here is where we can take advantage of Spade’s compiler and code
generation framework. With the knowledge of the application, Spade can
generate code that uses specialized checkpoint techniques for each operator
instance based on their parameters. For each operator we have to take into
account the following three aspects: (i) the minimal operator state required
in order to recover after a failure, (ii) whether the operator is able to produce
semantically correct results after a recovery from a failure, and (iii) whether
the restored state contains stale data. We assume a fail-stop model for an
operator failure.
Regarding operator state, Spade has both stateless and stateful operators.
An example of an operator that can be either stateless or stateful is a functor.
Functors perform tuple-level manipulations such as filtering, projection, and
mapping. For every incoming tuple, the functor generates an output, unless
the input tuple does not satisfy the filter predicate. If the filter predicate
does not involve any variables other than the attributes of the current tuple
(e.g., a stream attribute in a tuple is greater than a constant value), there is
no need to save state. If the operator crashes and restarts, it can still filter
tuples with the same predicate. The developer can also customize the functor
operator to update state variables when it receives a tuple (e.g., to compute
the running average for an attribute). In this case, a functor is stateful and
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the state variables should be checkpointed. Note that the variable value can
be affected by tuple loss (e.g., maximum value of an attribute). This should
be considered when deploying the checkpoint technique.
Depending on the operator type, checkpointing the internal operator state
and restarting it may not be sufficient to provide correct operator semantics.
One such case is the barrier operator. Barriers synchronize logically related
streams. The operator emits an output tuple every time it has at least one
tuple from all of its inputs. As described in Section 3.1, when a PE fails,
tuples may be lost during the recovery time. For a barrier operator to provide
correct results after recovery, we need to save in-flight tuples. If tuples are
lost, there is no guarantee that the logical pairing the operator produces is
correct. For this type of operator, it is mandatory to apply other techniques
that save in-flight tuples, such as upstream backup [65]. The advantage of
our technique is that through code generation, we can enforce in-flight tuple
buffering only for the operators that require such semantics.
In streaming applications, it is possible that the operator state is valid only
during a certain time frame. One example is the aggregate operator. The
aggregate operator groups and summarizes the incoming tuples according to
an operation (e.g, sum, average, among others). It performs the operation
over all the tuples that are inside a window boundary. One option available
to the developer is to parameterize the window behavior based on size (x)
and an output interval (y). The size of the window can be defined as all
the tuples accumulated over the last x seconds. As new tuples arrive, the
operator discards tuples older than x seconds. At every y seconds, the op-
erator computes the aggregate function based on the current contents of the
window. On the event of a failure, the restored state of an aggregate contains
all the tuples that are inside the window at the time of the checkpoint. This
means that on recovery the middleware must handle stale data. In normal
operation, some of these tuples would have been discarded due to the arrival
of new tuples. Therefore, the recovery routine has to eliminate the expired
tuples.
In the next sections we show how we modified the Spade infrastructure
to support checkpointing and how we added fault tolerance to user-defined
operators as well as the built-in join operator, which is an example of a
windowed operator. Our checkpointing technique applies to most other win-
dowed operators; however, this chapter focuses only on the join.
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3.2.1 SPADE Support
To selectively provide fault tolerance, we allow the users to define in their
source code what parts of their application should be fault tolerant by em-
ploying language constructs. After the users annotate their application, the
Spade compiler generates code that saves the state of the selected operators
with a pre-established frequency. For built-in Spade operators, the compiler
automatically generates checkpoint methods. The state of each operator is
assumed to be independent from the others. When operators are fused in the
same PE, each of their states is saved at their specified frequency. We do not
save them all at the same time to allow maximum possible throughput. Due
to performance overheads, the user may not want to checkpoint an operator
with a large state at the same frequency of an operator with small state. The
state independence also applies to PEs. During a PE recovery, the states of
other interconnected PEs are not rolled back.
Figure 3.3 is an example of how to specify that an operator should be check-
pointed. The example has a source (Source) and a UDOP (Udop) operator.
The source stream (CountStream) produces tuples with an integer (count)
and a string (str), extracted from the packets coming from a TCP client
located at src.somewhere.com:789. The UDOP creates an AverageStream
where each tuple contains an integer (avg) and a string (str). Note that
the UDOP contains the checkpoint keyword and the associated checkpoint
frequency in seconds (10).
stream CountStream(count: Int, str: String)
:= Source()
["ctcp://src.somewhere.com:789"]{}
stream AverageStream(avg: Int, str: String)
:= Udop(CountStream)["Avg"]{}
-> checkpoint=10 # 10 seconds
Figure 3.3: Checkpoint annotation in SPADE.
The Spade compiler generates code both for the operators and the PEs
(with or without fusion). For the operators, it generates extra code so it
can implement the checkpointing policy. The extra code is dependent on the
operator type and configuration. Further details on the generated code are
given in Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4. The compiler modifies the configuration of
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the PEs to selectively enable checkpoint services for its operators.
3.2.2 Runtime Support
The PE execution flow changes if any of the operators in a PE have the
checkpoint keyword. Figure 3.4 shows the PE operation steps with check-
pointing. A PE is comprised of a PEWrapper, which manages all the op-
erators it contains (OP1, OP2, and OP3). When the PE starts, it initi-
ates a thread (PECheckpoint) that is responsible for carrying out the check-
point policy (step 1). PECheckpoint verifies which operators should check-
point and builds a priority queue with their next checkpoint timeout. In
step 2, the thread removes the next operator to checkpoint from the queue
(getExpiringOperator()) and sleeps until it is time to save the next state
snapshot. When the thread wakes up, it invokes the getCheckpoint()
method of the operator (step 3). This method contains the logic to seri-
alize the operator state. While the getCheckpoint() method executes, the
operator cannot process any new incoming tuples. Once the method call
returns, the thread saves the serialized state to the storage subsystem via
the OPState class (step 4). OPState saves the new state in a temporary file
first, which is later renamed to a permanent file through an atomic rename()
operation.
getCheckpoint(ckpt)
PEWrapper
OP1 OP2 OP3
PECheckpoint
Thread->
Create() OPState
getExpiringOperator()
saveState()
.PEid.ckpt/
Temp-i.ckpt
.PEid.ckpt/
Perm-i.ckpt
rename()
1
2
3
4
Figure 3.4: PE checkpoint operation.
The PE recovery is similar. Its operation is shown in Figure 3.5. When the
PE starts up, it invokes a method from the PECheckpoint class to start the
recovery operation (step 1). This method searches for the checkpoint files
based on the PE and the operator IDs (step 2). These identifiers are constant
throughout the lifetime of the PE. At first, the restore procedure checks the
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integrity of the checkpoint file via a hash value computed and stored by
the OPState class. If the file is corrupted, the procedure discards the state
and the operator restarts with a fresh state. One option is to maintain
different versions of checkpoint files and restore an older checkpoint in case
of corruption of the latest one. File corruption is handled differently when
the operator rebuilds its state from multiple files. Such a case is described
in Section 3.2.4 in the context of the join operator. When the checkpoint
file is valid, the restore routine invokes the method restoreCheckpoint()
in the operator class (step 3). Similarly to the serialization function, the
de-serialization implementation is specialized for each operator type.
restoreCheckpoint(ckpt)
restoreState()
for(numOps) {
getOperatorSize(i)
2
3
OP1 OP2 OP3 getOperatorState(i)}
PEWrapper PECheckpoint OPStaterestorePEState()
1
.PEId.ckpt/
Perm-i.ckpt
Figure 3.5: PE recovery operation.
3.2.3 User-Defined Operator
In Spade, the user has the capability to extend the basic set of built-in
operators via user-defined operators (UDOPs). With UDOPs, the developers
can use external libraries and implement customized operations for their
particular application. Spade generates skeleton code so the user can easily
handle tuples from System S streams, process them with the specialized code,
and send them over as a System S stream to other operators.
To checkpoint UDOPs, the Spade compiler adds checkpoint method in-
terfaces to the generated skeleton. The user has to fill in the methods with
the appropriate serialization logic. This approach is similar to the technique
employed in the fault tolerant CORBA standard for application-level state
checkpointing [75]. The PECheckpoint thread automatically invokes the se-
rialization methods at the specified frequency.
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Figure 3.6 gives the generated interfaces and an example of how to add
the serialization code. This is part of the Spade output for the code given
in Figure 3.3. In this example, the state of the UDOP has two member
variables, namely avgCount and numCount. The user receives a reference to
a serialization buffer object (SBuffer), used both for the state saving and
restoring methods. The user has to serialize/de-serialize the data to/from the
buffer in the same order. Because other methods can modify the member
variables during checkpoint, they must be protected by a mutual exclusion
construct.
void UDOP_Avg::getCheckpoint(SBuffer &checkpoint) {
AutoMutex am(mutex);
checkpoint << avgCount << numCount;
}
void UDOP_Avg::restoreCheckpoint(SBuffer &checkpoint) {
AutoMutex am(mutex);
checkpoint >> avgCount >> numCount;
}
Figure 3.6: UDOP checkpoint interface.
3.2.4 Join Operator
The join operator correlates two streams. The streams are paired up based
on the join predicate and the window configuration. Two different windows
(one per incoming stream) group the tuples from each incoming stream.
Each stream can have a different window configuration. The window keeps
the input tuples in the order of arrival. Once the operator receives an input
tuple from stream 1, it evaluates the predicate condition against all tuples in
the window of stream 2. If the predicate evaluates to true, the operator pairs
the matching tuples and sends them downstream. After the pairing stage,
the operator inserts the input tuple into its corresponding window. If the
window is full, the oldest tuple is discarded, i.e., the window slides.
A join operator can have an arbitrarily large window. For example, the
application described in Section 3.3.1 has three join operators. The sizes of
two of them are 512,000 and 128,000 tuples. Tuples in join operators may
accumulate over a long period of time, depending on the stream input rate.
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If the operator crashes and there is no checkpoint, the operator produces few
outputs for a long time, since it has to fill up its windows in order to produce
matches at full rate. With checkpointing, we can recover most of the window
content. Therefore, the operator is able to produce matches right after the
restore operation.
If for the join operator we use the same checkpoint technique employed for
UDOPs, all the tuples inside the window should be serialized. This results
in the serialization of large chunks of data, which introduces a prohibitive
performance overhead. To overcome this problem, we devised an incremen-
tal checkpointing technique for sliding window-based operators, such as joins.
Incremental checkpointing algorithms for stream computing require perform-
ing a checkpoint maintenance operation per tuple that arrives to an opera-
tor [21]. For low-cost checkpointing, both tuple insertion and serialization
should be lightweight operations.
Incremental Checkpoint Algorithm
In a sliding window configuration, as new tuples arrive, the older ones are
evicted from the window. This behavior can be implemented with a double-
ended queue data structure. New tuples are inserted at the tail of the queue
and old tuples are removed from the head of the queue. Between two check-
points, the state of the operator can be described by two possible configu-
rations. In the first configuration the window only has new tuples, meaning
that the total number of new tuples since the last checkpoint is greater than
the size of the window. In this case there is no common state between the
last checkpoint and the current one. If the number of new tuples is less than
the size of the window, the serialization time can be decreased by not repeat-
ing this operation for tuples that are part of both the last and the current
checkpoint.
We devised a circular buffer data structure that divides the sliding window
into fixed groups of tuples. As a result, we can control the number of check-
point files and avoid the garbage collection problem. At every checkpoint
interval, we verify which groups have new tuples and save their contents to
disk, serializing both new and old tuples in a group. We limit re-serialization
by dividing the window into smaller groups. Groups that did not change
between two checkpoint intervals do not need to be re-saved. Since it is a
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sliding window, only groups with more recent tuples change.
Each position in the circular buffer contains the following data: (i) a check-
pointing file name; (ii) a dirty bit, which indicates if group should be seri-
alized to disk; (iii) the current number of tuples in the group; and (iv) the
window index of the most recent tuple in the group, so we can correctly
index the double-ended queue data structure. To decrease the performance
overhead, our algorithm updates the circular buffer only at every checkpoint
interval.
The number of positions in the circular buffer data structure is based on
the number of tuples we want to save per checkpoint operation. We divide
the window size by the number of tuples per checkpoint file and add one
extra position. The extra position accounts for the window slide.
Figure 3.7 gives an example of a count-based 15-tuple sliding window. In
this example, we divide the window in groups of five tuples. This results
in four checkpoint groups. At checkpoint time t1, the window contains 13
new tuples (A-M). G1 and G2 contain five tuples each, while G3 contains
three. The checkpoint routine evaluates the circular buffer structure and
finds that G1, G2, and G3 are dirty. At this point, it serializes the tuples
based on the indexes maintained by the circular buffer. As in UDOPs, no
tuple processing is allowed during serialization. After the serialization, the
checkpoint routine cleans the dirty bits in the circular buffer and saves the
tuple contents to disk. At time t2, the window has five new tuples. G3 has
tuples N-O and G4 has tuples P-R. G1 lost three tuples (A-C) due to the
window slide. The checkpoint method checks that G3 and G4 are dirty and
serializes all their contents to disk (K-R). Even though G1 lost tuples, its
corresponding file is not updated. This file is invalid only after G1 loses all
its tuples. The checkpoint thread reuses this file after the window slides by
a whole group size.
Restore Algorithm
To recover the operator state, we read all files related to a window. Since
we use a circular buffer, the first valid tuple of the window can be in any
group. We start to rebuild the window from the file that has the oldest write
timestamp. The oldest file corresponds to the window segment that was not
updated for the longest time; hence, it is the beginning of the sliding window.
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Figure 3.7: Join checkpointing operation.
Restoring all the tuples from the oldest file may result in a window bigger
than its maximum size. Thus, we discard all tuples that exceed the total size
of the window.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, another factor we have to consider during
state restore operations is stale data. If the operator had not crashed, some
of the tuples from the beginning of the window would have been discarded.
We eliminate the stale data by estimating how many tuples would have been
discarded during normal operation. The estimate is used to remove the top
N tuples from the window. We compute the number of stale tuples by the
following formula:
Ntuples = (Trecovery − Tserialization) ∗Ntuples/sec
Trecovery is the time after the de-serialization routine completes. The time
of operator state serialization (Tserialization) and the number of tuples per
second (Ntuples/sec) are retrieved from the checkpoint file. Both data are
obtained at runtime and are serialized with the tuples to the checkpoint file.
Note that we calculate an approximation of the number of stale tuples, since
there may be a variance on the input tuple rate.
Our recovery routine also handles corrupted checkpoint files. As the oper-
ator state is divided in different files, even if one of the files is corrupted by
a disk failure, we can still recover the operator state. The implication of a
corrupted file is the loss of, at most, the same number of tuples contained in
a checkpoint group. If the application cannot tolerate tuple loss, the under-
lying file system has to apply replication techniques. Kwon et al. [19] showed
that using replicated file systems to store checkpoint files has acceptable
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performance overhead.
Code Generation
To enable checkpointing, the Spade compiler generated modified join code.
The join operator code has two main methods – one for each input port.
These methods are changed to include a mutual exclusion variable and a
counter of new tuples per window. This is the only code added to the operator
critical path. For per-group1 join operators [4] – where the operator allocates
a new sliding window depending on the tuple key attribute content – we add
code to dynamically allocate our circular buffer data structure and the new
tuple counter.
The new counter helps to estimate the operator input rate and to update
the indices contained in the circular buffer. Once the checkpoint method
runs, it slides the circular buffer data structure by the number of new tuples.
The circular buffer code is generic and does not need to be specialized for
each join configuration. The only parameters it needs are the window size
and the number of tuples each checkpoint group has. This number can be
estimated based on the tuple size and operator input rate and can be learned
during the operator profiling phase [42].
For incremental checkpointing, the checkpoint method interface changes.
Since we need independent serializable buffers, we add extra checkpoint meth-
ods at the operator interface. The checkpoint thread invokes the correct
checkpoint/restore method according to the operator type.
For per-group join operators we automatically generate a specialized class
that associates serialization buffers and per-group keys. Since the key type
is dependent on the tuple type, which is defined at the language level, the
checkpoint thread does not know the key type. This specialized class ab-
stracts the serialization buffer key-based access to the checkpoint thread. In
Section 3.3.2 we show the overhead imposed by our technique both for join
operators with one sliding window and for per-group joins.
1A per-group operator emulates the existence of disjoint instances of the operator
processing tuples associated with one logical group; for example, joining stock market
transactions related to IBM independently from transactions related to Google. Note
that, in this example, the per-group key attribute is the company attribute.
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3.3 Experimental Evaluation
To evaluate our technique, we conducted two different experiments. The first
employs checkpointing in a UDOP that is part of a real-world manufacturing
application. The application builds statistical models over streaming data.
The experimental objective is to evaluate how the application behaves under
a UDOP failure by quantifying the crash impact on the accuracy of the appli-
cation output. The second experiment evaluates the performance overhead
of our checkpoint technique for join operators. We devised synthetic applica-
tions with different join configurations and evaluate how different checkpoint
parameters impact the operator performance.
3.3.1 Application Output Deviation
To quantify the impact of our checkpoint technique on the application output,
we used an application called FAB [76]. FAB generates two statistical models
from several sensors embedded in semiconductor manufacturing tools used in
IBM’s chip manufacturing facilities. The models are built to predict the wafer
yield from the input sensors. One of FAB’s outputs is a quality metric (QM),
which compares the value predicted by the statistical model and the ground
truth, i.e., the actual wafer yield metric. For our runs, the actual wafer
yield was collected along with sensor reading from the real manufacturing
environment during the production of 9000 wafers.
For this experiment, we use FAB’s QM to quantify how our checkpoint
technique performs when facing crashes in the operator that creates and
maintains the incrementally built classification model. This operator is im-
plemented as a UDOP, which generates model parameters based on informa-
tion accumulated during runtime. If the UDOP crashes and no checkpointing
is implemented, it loses all its collected information. Therefore, after a UDOP
restore, it rebuilds its model parameters from scratch, losing valuable historic
data previously used to fine-tune the classification model. When checkpoint-
ing is in place, all the UDOP state variables are maintained. After recovery,
the UDOP produces model parameters from the same state it had before
the crash. For this application, we do not buffer tuples while the operator
is recovering. If any input tuple is sent to the UDOP while it is oﬄine, the
tuple is discarded. Note that while there is the potential for data loss, it does
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not critically affect the accuracy of the classification model.
Figure 3.8 shows FAB’s dataflow graph, which has 79 operators. For the
purpose of this experiment, we run one operator per PE. If we inject a crash
fault in the statistical model operator (PE 74 in Figure 3.8), all the other 78
operators will continue to run. The PEs are distributed across 10 nodes, each
with 4 Intel Xeon 3 GHz processors. The average runtime of the application is
30 minutes. However, we consider that one experimental run is complete only
when all the sensor inputs available have been processed. To quantify the
output deviation of the application, we ran FAB in the following scenarios: (i)
FAB without UDOP checkpoint and no PE crash (S1); (ii) FAB with UDOP
checkpoint at every 1 second and PE crash (S2); and (iii) FAB without UDOP
checkpoint and PE crash (S3).
Figure 3.8: FAB dataflow graph.
We ran each scenario 40 times. For S1, all runs produced the same pre-
dicted wafer yield. Even though FAB contains non-deterministic operators
(e.g., time-based operators), they did not affect the QM output during our
runs. We used this output as the baseline to compute output deviation under
the PE crash scenarios.
Since the time of the failure can impact the output deviation due to the
amount of accumulated state in the classification model, each run has a
different crash time. For S2, we randomly pick a time between the beginning
of the application and the average application runtime (30 minutes). At that
time, we inject a fault in the statistical model PE via a kill command. We
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restore the PE after 2 to 5 seconds, which is the estimated failure detection
time in System S. Once all input is processed, we finish the application and
collect all its results (e.g., predicted wafer yield) and injection data (e.g.,
crash time). S3 employs the same fault injection parameters as S2, so we
can compare outputs produced with equivalent failure times. For example,
if in a run the PE crashed after 10 minutes and its recovery took place after
3 seconds, we try to repeat the same failed run for the new configuration.
To minimize timing variations and more accurately approximate the crash
time, we collect the number of processed tuples upon a crash in S2 and inject
a fault once this number is reached in S3. Despite not being a fine-grained
fault trigger, such as a low-level instruction address, the approach has shown
to be effective in practice. The average of total processed tuples for the two
scenarios is very close (5370.85 for S2 and 5370.875 for S3, where 5381 is the
total number of tuples for S1).
S1 produces 107 wafer yield predictions and outputs the aforementioned
QM for each one of them. We compare each QM produced by the run without
PE crash and the run with PE crash. The difference between the two QMs
is called prediction error. To evaluate the overall output deviation between
failed runs and the golden run we computed the root mean squared error
(RMSE) of the prediction errors. The RMSE shows how far from the correct
answer the failed runs are on average. Note that we compare wafer yield
prediction errors starting from the failure point onward. Every prediction
produced before the failure is discarded from the RMSE computation.
The RMSE for S2 is 4.80, while that for S3 is 7.79. Our experiments show
that the prediction error distribution for the runs without checkpointing have
longer tails than the runs with checkpointing. This means that runs without
checkpoint produced QM samples very distant from the correct value. This
can be seen in Figure 3.9, which shows the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) for the prediction errors in one of our runs. The prediction errors are
in log scale. For this run, the checkpoint scenario generated results where
the predicted value was at most 6 points away from the correct value. On the
other hand, the checkpoint-free scenario produced predictions that reached
up to 52 points away from the correct value.
The performance overhead for checkpointing FAB’s statistical model op-
erator is negligible, since it did not change the tuple processing rate. It also
did not affect the results produced by the non-deterministic operators down-
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Figure 3.9: CDF of prediction error.
stream. We observed this by checking that all the measured QMs before
operator crash were identical to the ones produced by the checkpoint-free
run.
3.3.2 Checkpoint Performance Overhead
To quantify the performance overhead of our checkpointing technique for join
operators, we devised two synthetic Spade applications. Each application
contains four operators, as shown by Figure 3.10. Two of them are source
operators, which send data to a join operator. The join operator, as shown
by Figure 3.10 correlates the data and sends the output to a sink operator.
The sink writes the join output to a file. The objective is to stress the join
operator and evaluate the checkpoint technique under high data loads.
Figure 3.10: Synthetic application dataflow graph.
The two applications differ by their join window configuration. They both
correlate stream 1 (S1) with stream 2 (S2); however, the second application
uses the per-group window modifier for S1. The attributes in S1 are two
integers and one 70-byte string. S2 contains one integer and one 10-byte
string. The join matches the streams when the integer of S1 is equal to the
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one in S2. The join output stream contains all attributes from S1 plus the
string attribute from S2.
The operators are hosted by four PEs, which are placed in four different
nodes interconnected by Gigabit Ethernet. Each node runs Linux on four
Intel Xeon 3 GHz processors. Both source and sink operators read/write
data to their local hard disk. The join operator saves its checkpoint files
in a shared file system, in this case NFS. The NFS server is shared with
approximately another 200 nodes.
Single-Window Join
For the first application, we evaluate the checkpoint performance varying the
window size and the group size. The window of S1 is parameterized with the
following sizes: 8192, 16,384, 32,768, 65,536 and 131,072. The window of
S2 is fixed with size 0. Tuples from S2 are compared against S1 to generate
an output tuple, but the operator does not maintain S2 tuples in its inter-
nal window buffers. Therefore, the checkpoint routine serializes only tuples
from the first window. The statistical distribution for both data sources is
uniform. We evaluated the checkpoint overhead for this scenario under two
checkpoint frequencies: 1 and 10 seconds. To assess how the window group
size impacts the performance, we divided the window of S1 in four different
group sizes. Each window size was divided in the following number of tu-
ples/group: 512, 1024, 2048 and 4096. We ran each configuration 30 times,
where each execution lasted 200 seconds.
The checkpoint overhead is compared to the operator performance when
running without checkpoint (I/O rate with checkpoint / I/O rate without
checkpoint). Each window configuration has a different input/output (I/O)
rate, which is shown in Table 3.1. The input rate is the sum of the inputs
from S1 and S2. In all configurations, the input rate is evenly distributed (ap-
proximately 50% for each input stream). The rate is in tuples/second. Note
that the input rate decreases as the size of the window increases. Because
the operator has a greater number of tuple comparisons to make, it cannot
process as many tuples as it could in the case of smaller windows. This cre-
ates back pressure on the output ports of the source operators, leading to
lower input rates.
Figure 3.11 shows how much the checkpoint operation at every 1 second
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Table 3.1: I/O rates for single-window join in tuples/second.
Window Size Input Rate Output Rate
8192 9350.94 25,451.04
16,384 5054.39 27,180.69
32,768 2503.25 25,643.36
65,536 970.19 14,099.27
131,071 889.64 13,062.59
affects the I/O rate of the join operator. When the window size is 8192,
the checkpoint overhead is greater than 5% in all configurations. As Table
3.1 shows, the input rate for this operator is 9350.94 tuples/second. This
means that the number of new tuples is more than half of the window size,
implying that, most of the time, we have to save the full window. Since
there are few common states between checkpoint intervals, our technique
does not have good performance. As the window size increases, we can see
the benefit of our algorithm. For a window of size 32,768, the configuration
with 512 tuples/group shows less than 1% performance overhead. A reason
this scenario has better performance than configurations with a bigger group
size is that a group of 512 tuples results in less data re-serialization. Note
that as the number of groups increases, the overhead of managing more files
increases as well. However, this overhead did not affect the performance here,
since it had the least performance penalty.
Figure 3.11: I/O relative performance for single-window join with checkpoint
interval of 1 second.
Figure 3.12 shows the I/O rates for a checkpoint interval of 10 seconds. The
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I/O rates are higher compared to the 1 second scenario, since the checkpoint-
ing routine spends less time in serialization. When the checkpoint interval
is larger, the performance is better for bigger group sizes. As the checkpoint
interval increases, it is expected that a configuration with higher numbers of
tuples/group performs better, since it needs to manage a smaller number of
files.
Figure 3.12: I/O relative performance for single-window join with checkpoint
interval of 10 seconds.
Per-Group Join
The second application uses the join operator with the per-group modifier
for S1. The window has size 1024 tuples for S1 and 0 for S2. The per-group
modifier generates one window of size 1024 based on a key attribute of the
stream. In this case, the attribute is one of the integers of S1. For this
experiment, the stream data has 50 different integers for S1 and 600 different
integers for S2 uniformly distributed. This generates 50 different windows
of size 1024. Therefore, at every checkpoint interval, we have to serialize
new tuples in 50 different windows. Here, each window is divided in four
different groups sizes. The numbers of tuples/group are 32, 64, 128 and 256.
The checkpoint intervals are 1 and 10 seconds. We ran each configuration 30
times, where each run lasted 200 seconds.
Figure 3.13 shows the I/O relative performance for the per-group join. The
averages for input and output for the configuration without checkpoint are
2026.52 tuples/second and 75,856.67 tuples/second, respectively. When the
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checkpoint interval is 1 second, the group size of 64 is the configuration with
lower performance impact. The number of input tuples/second decreases
by 1.37%, while the output rate decreases by 1.83%. When the checkpoint
interval is 10 seconds, the configuration with better I/O performance is asso-
ciated with a group size of 32. However, our data shows that the checkpoint
thread is able to start a serialization, on average, once every 10.5 seconds.
Not meeting the checkpoint interval deadline results in a higher loss of tuples
during recovery, since there will be more stale data in the files. When the
group size is 256, the performance impact is higher, but it gets the operator
state at every 10.09 seconds. In general, the performance impact is higher
when the join operator has the per-group modifier. A per-group join has more
checkpointing data structures to maintain and more files to save; hence, the
serialization phase takes longer.
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Figure 3.13: I/O relative performance for per-group join.
We conducted experiments to evaluate the per-group join checkpointing
when the key attribute of the source data follows a Zipf distribution. Word
frequency is an example of a distribution that follows Zipf’s law [77]. In our
scenario, this means that some windows have a greater number of new tuples
than others. Our data shows that the I/O performance impact is lower than
the per-group join under uniform distribution (2%-3% overhead). However,
the checkpoint thread is not able to meet the checkpoint deadlines. Instead
of serializing the operator state at every 1 second, the checkpointing routine
serializes the operator state at every 6 seconds on average. This happens
because a lot of data must be rewritten to disk for windows with a low tuple
insertion rate. For example, we have to re-save a whole chunk of data even
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when there is only one new tuple in the group. Our results suggest that, when
the stream data does not follow a uniform distribution, we should divide the
window corresponding to different keys with different group sizes.
3.4 Related Work
Many techniques tailored for streaming applications add fault tolerance by
changing the communication substrate. We argue that this slows down the
maximum throughput of the system and should only be applied in selected
parts of the application. Balazinska et al. [64] propose a protocol called de-
lay, process and correct (DPC). When a failure occurs, stream operators may
produce tentative tuples that need to be corrected later on. The developer
has to know how to correct results that were produced with tentative tuples.
Our aim is to abstract out the fault tolerance from the user by providing a
language-level abstraction. Additionally, DPC may require operator check-
pointing to recover from a failure. Our techniques can complement DPC.
Another set of fault tolerance techniques is based on operator replication.
Passive standby, active standby [65], and process-pairs [20] were adapted to
the streaming context. Hwang et al. [65] describe upstream backup, which
enforces tuple backup in upstream operators. Tuples are replayed in case of
failure. This technique also changes the communication substrate. Cai et
al. [66] propose a hybrid replication-based technique. Replicas are brought
up-to-date via checkpoints of the active replica.
LSS [21] (lightweight summary structure) is a checkpoint technique more
similar to our approach. Zhu et al. assume that data loss is acceptable dur-
ing the failure and recovery process of a streaming application. LSS provides
an API that should be embedded in the operator code right after a tuple
is processed. We automate this process by using the Spade’s code genera-
tion framework to output specific checkpoint methods based on the operator
type. Hwang et al. [18] propose delta checkpoints for both aggregate and join
operators. Our work differs by proposing different checkpoint techniques
depending on the operator failure semantic. SGuard [19] employs memory
management middleware to track application-level memory pages. It uses
copy-on-write to perform asynchronous checkpoints. Our technique lets the
user choose which operators should apply a checkpointing scheme, decreasing
the overall performance overhead. Our incremental checkpoint technique also
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handles corrupted checkpoint files without requiring a replicated file system
like SGuard does.
Some research aims to provide application fault tolerance at the language
level [78, 79]. Szentiva´nyi et al. [80] use aspect-oriented programming fea-
tures for building fault tolerant applications. CATCH (Compiler-Assisted
Techniques for Checkpointing) [81] is a compiler-based approach to trans-
parently checkpoint applications. It does not use language extensions; how-
ever, it uses compile-time information to establish checkpoint interval and
size. CATCH is a process-level technique and does not apply to our concept
of operator-based checkpointing. Bronevetsky et al. [82] introduce a pre-
compiler that instruments MPI programs for automatic checkpointing. The
users annotate their application with potential checkpointing sites. This ap-
proach aims at parallel applications, whose behavior is different from that of
streaming applications. Even though streaming applications are distributed,
we propose techniques to save stream operators based on their semantic and
failure behavior.
3.5 Summary
Large-scale stream processing is becoming a paradigm for developing long-
running applications that will monitor, control, and extract knowledge from
the critical infrastructure in a wide array of operational areas: monitor-
ing and acting on sophisticated manufacturing tools and fabrication pro-
cesses [76], business processes such as algorithmic trading [4], surveillance
and fraud detection systems, personal healthcare, and public health systems.
All demonstrate how critical it is to develop mechanisms that will ensure
these applications and the components that make up the middleware sup-
porting them have the means to stay up and operating continuously, even in
the presence of software and hardware failures.
This chapter has shown how language primitives coupled with code gen-
eration can provide a flexible mechanism for specifying well-targeted state
checkpointing to large-scale applications. We have also shown how incre-
mental checkpointing can be carried out for a stream join operator, which is
a fundamental building block in applications that carry out data correlation
on live streams.
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Chapter 4
FAULT INJECTION INTO STREAM
PROCESSING APPLICATIONS
Although stringent fault tolerance techniques for stream computing [19, 22,
69] provide guarantees that no data is lost or that any inconsistency ex-
ists (e.g., duplicate delivery of the same data item, which we refer to as
data duplication), these methods usually cause significant degradation in
performance. Aiming at reducing such performance overhead, partial fault
tolerance (PFT) techniques [16, 21, 27, 71, 83] have been proposed. These
techniques assume that data loss and data duplicates1 are acceptable under
faulty conditions. The rationale is that many streaming applications toler-
ate data imprecision by design, and, as a result, can still achieve correctness
without using stringent fault tolerance methods.
While all of the above techniques require careful evaluation to assess the
fault tolerance achieved and the resulting performance degradation, this is
especially true for methods that provide PFT. Hence, the use of PFT is not
viable without a clear understanding of the impact of faults on the application
output.
This chapter describes a methodology used for evaluating the effectiveness
of PFT techniques in streaming applications. Our first goal is to provide
the developers a method to assess the impact of PFT on the output of their
application. We propose the use of fault injection [84] to mimic the effect of
a fault in the application when a specific PFT mechanism is in place. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to describe a methodology to exper-
imentally evaluate PFT techniques in a streaming application. Our second
goal is to characterize how each stream operator behaves under failures, so
the developer can decide if the PFT technique in place is adequate for the
target operator. We characterize each operator by calculating four evaluation
metrics over the application output generated during the injection trials. In
1TCP provides reliable communication as long as the communicating processes do not
crash.
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addition, the metrics can be used to identify which operators are most crit-
ical to the application output quality. Prioritizing most critical operators
when protecting an application with PFT methods leads to lower resource
utilization while maintaining output quality.
Analyzing the impact of faults in streaming applications involves many
challenges that are not addressed by traditional fault injection methodologies
[84, 85]. Streaming applications can have multiple independent outputs,
tolerate approximate results, and be non-deterministic. In addition, these
applications produce results continuously, requiring a careful analysis of the
output to estimate the fault impact. We address these issues by (i) defining
an output score function (OSF) to measure the application output quality
and compare it with the output under faults, and (ii) using the OSF over
limited sections of the output to compute our proposed evaluation metrics.
We illustrate our methodology by assessing an application running on top
of System S. Our experiments with a bursty data loss fault model in a fi-
nancial engineering streaming application show the following results: (i) The
impact on the application output quality varies widely for faults in different
stream operators, demonstrating that operator sensitivity to faults is an im-
portant differentiator in deploying PFT. (ii) The tested application provided
some surprising results; specifically, one stream operator with high selectiv-
ity turned out to be the least critical in terms of quality degradation when
subjected to data loss. These results indicate that PFT can be a powerful
technique to maintain the accuracy of the results and preserve computing
resources by replicating only parts of the application.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 discusses the effect of
partial fault tolerance techniques on stream processing applications. Section
4.2 describes the evaluation methodology. Section 4.3 describes the fault in-
jection framework. Section 4.4 discusses the set of proposed metrics and how
to evaluate the injection outcome. Section 4.5 presents our results applied
in the financial engineering domain. Section 4.6 contrasts related work with
our methodology, and Section 4.7 summarizes the chapter.
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4.1 Partial Fault Tolerance
Several researchers [16, 21, 27, 71, 83] have described PFT techniques that
are applicable to stream processing applications. While all leverage the par-
tial and often strategic employment of fault tolerance techniques to lower
performance loss, no technique can guarantee perfect application output un-
der faulty conditions. Different PFT mechanisms have different effects on
the input/output stream of the failed operator and, as a result, on the appli-
cation output. Hence, assessment methodology and appropriate metrics are
needed.
The technique described in Chapter 3 and in [27] is based on a stream op-
erator checkpoint mechanism that leverages code generation to automatically
provide specialized state serialization methods depending on the stream oper-
ator type. The state serialization methods are based on the stream operator
type and failure semantic. When an operator fails, its upstream operators do
not buffer outgoing tuples unless they are required to produce a semantically
correct result after a fault. Checkpointing [27] results in bursty tuple loss on
the operator input stream.
Another example of PFT is to employ free running replicas, as proposed by
Murty and Welsh [71]. This technique does not enforce determinism among
the stream operator replicas, resulting in different effects on the operator out-
put stream, such as tuple reordering, duplication, loss, and value divergence.
To evaluate how applications behave under PFT techniques, it is critical
to understand the effect of faults on the input and output stream of the
operator. Note that we are not concerned with the specific mechanism used
by the stream processing middleware to detect a fault in a stream operator
(e.g., heartbeats) and to restart the operator. Nevertheless, these detection
and recovery times are important to determine the duration of the fault effect.
4.2 Evaluation Methodology
Our experimental methodology uses fault injection to characterize the output
quality of a streaming application in the presence of faults while a specific
PFT mechanism is in use. We assume that a fault detector and a fault tol-
erance mechanism are already in place and have been validated. We also
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assume that a stream operator fails by crashing in a fail-fast manner (i.e.,
clean crash). The selected fault model is broad because operator failures
could be due to several distinct and indirect causes: a node failure (e.g., op-
erating system kernel crash), a transient software fault (e.g., race condition),
or a transient hardware fault that causes a crash (e.g., memory bit flip causes
a process crash).
Characterizing the error behavior of streaming applications presents many
challenges. A deterministic application can be checked for correct behavior
under faults by comparing the output of the faulty run to the output of
the fault-free run (also called the golden run) [85]. In streaming applica-
tions, checking the correct behavior cannot be done by a simple bit-by-bit
comparison of the faulty and fault-free outputs. Such applications are often
non-deterministic2, and are typically able to tolerate imprecise results.
To understand how a fault affects the application output, we compute
an output score function (OSF). The OSF is calculated over a set of tuples
of the output of the application and is applied for both the faulty and the
golden output. Figure 4.1 shows two samples of streaming application out-
puts [4, 76]. Figure 4.1(a) shows a sample output of the financial engineering
application described in Section 4.5.1. The output contains the ticker symbol
of a company in the stock market and the projected financial gain obtained
by buying a stock at a specific time. In this case, the OSF is a summation
of the financial gain (i.e., 101.10). Figure 4.1(b) shows a sample output of
a chip manufacturing application [76]. The output contains the predicted
wafer yield of a manufacturing process and a prediction error, indicating the
extent to which the prediction deviates from the ground truth. In this case,
the OSF is the prediction error average (i.e., 0.06). The OSF is application-
specific and can be complex depending on the application. In addition, the
OSF should be sensitive to faults, i.e., change its value statistically signifi-
cantly under faults. In our experiments, we evaluate the OSF sensitivity by
conducting a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov hypothesis test [86].
To assess the quality of the output under faults, we define a quality score
(QS), which is the ratio of the average OSF calculated over the faulty output
(i.e., the application output produced in the presence of an operator fault)
by the average OSF calculated over the golden output. This ratio estimates
2A source of non-determinism is the multiplexing of multiple streams, where the relative
order of tuple arrival to an operator is arbitrary.
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Ticker
Financial
gain
IBM 41.66
BAC 30.56
TWX 28.88
(a)
Predicted Prediction
wafer yield error
95 0.06
98 0.02
92 0.10
(b)
Figure 4.1: Examples of application output.
the fractional deviation of the faulty result and the correct result. The OSF
average is obtained by executing the application multiple times with the
same configuration (e.g., same injected fault). The average accounts for the
stochastic deviations on output caused by the application non-determinism.
The average OSF and the QS are the basis for the proposed evaluation met-
rics. In addition, our metrics consider that stream operators can fail at
different execution times, and that the time to detect and repair from such
failure can vary. Figure 4.2 gives a possible failure scenario. Different ex-
ecution times are represented in our methodology by the injection of faults
into operators at different stream offsets from the beginning of the input
stream. Different detection and repair times are represented by the injection
of faults with different outage durations. We do not make assumptions about
the operator failure probability distribution.
failure
failure 
detection
stream operator 
lifetime
(stream offset)
detection 
latency
repair
time
d ioutage  urat on
Figure 4.2: Failure of a stream operator.
Our evaluation metrics characterize each operator in the following terms.
(i) The outage duration impact is defined as the correlation coefficient be-
tween the outage duration and the QS computed over the part of the output
stream affected by the fault. If the correlation coefficient is high, there is a
direct quality improvement by applying techniques with lower recovery time
for the target operator. (ii) The data dependency is defined as the standard
deviation and analysis of variance (ANOVA) test of the QS obtained under
faults injected into different stream offsets. A high standard deviation and
45
rejected ANOVA test indicates that the impact of the fault on the quality
is dependent on the specific data affected by the fault. (iii) The recovery
time is defined as the P percentile of the QS observations over time that
fall outside an error threshold. A high value for this metric indicates that
the application takes a long time to stabilize and to start producing correct
results again. (iv) The quality impact is defined as the sum of the squares of
the difference between the faulty QS and the golden QS evaluated over time.
A high sum value indicates that answers produced by the application under
faults are distant from the correct result. More details on the computation of
each metric can be found in Section 4.4.2. Note that our metrics are related
to the effects that a fault has on the application output. These metrics can
be used in addition to other usual performance evaluation metrics, such as
application throughput and the end-to-end latency of a tuple.
Streaming applications can also have multiple independent outputs (called
sinks). This situation arises when parts of the dataflow graph are re-used
for a different computation (e.g., by using different statistical models [76]).
Figure 4.3 shows an application with 10 stream operators. In this example,
three different sources are processed to generate the results output by two
different sinks. Each sink stores the results of a different computation over
the incoming data.
sources
sinks
Figure 4.3: Sample stream processing application.
To optimize the fault injections, we consider only the stream operators on
the path of a specific sink, i.e., the sink dependency graph. The operators
on the sink dependency graph are shown with filled boxes in Figure 4.3. A
different OSF should be defined for each sink of the application.
The methodology to evaluate each sink comprises the following steps:
1. Choose a fault model according to the in-place PFT technique. The
fault model is selected in correspondence to a recovery technique used
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to restore the operator upon a fault. In our experiments, we consider
a bursty tuple loss model.
2. Optimize fault injection target operators. Conditioned on the chosen
fault model, only certain operators must be selected and subjected to
fault injection. For example, operators that are not sensitive to the
selected fault model do not need to be selected as an experimentation
target.
3. Use the actual expected data rate from stream sources to realistically
model the effect of a fault. For example, the knowledge of the real data
input rate allows quantifying how much data is dropped when a fault
occurs.
4. Inject faults at different stream offsets and with distinct outage dura-
tions. Injecting faults at different stream offsets mimics random fault
arrival times during the operator execution. Different outage durations
mimic variations of the detection and recovery times.
5. Evaluate the experimental results. Based on the OSF function, each
operator is characterized using the proposed metrics. Using these met-
rics, the developer can quantify the relative sensitivity of the operators
to faults, and use them as a basis to compare different fault tolerance
techniques.
4.3 Fault Injection Framework
To assess the impact of PFT, we built a fault injection framework to emulate
the effect of these techniques on the input/output streams of a target stream
operator. Currently, the framework supports a bursty tuple loss fault model,
but it can be extended to include other fault models (e.g., tuple duplica-
tion). Bursty tuple loss can emulate the following situations: (i) a stateless
operator crashes and restarts, and no in-flight tuples are saved; (ii) a stateful
operator crashes and restores its state from a checkpoint upon restart, and
no in-flight tuples are saved. The checkpoint preserves the operator state
immediately before the occurrence of the fault; and (iii) a stateful/stateless
operator crashes and perfoms a failover to a replica. The operator has only
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one input stream and the backup replica is operating at approximately the
same pace as the primary replica. In addition, injecting bursty tuple loss in
the source operator can emulate faults affecting the real stream source (e.g.,
sensors) and data drop due to bursty data arrival and limited input buffer
size. These faults are not protected by any of the fault tolerance techniques
that guarantee no tuple loss [19, 22, 64, 69].
4.3.1 Emulating Faulty Behavior
Our fault injection framework is designed to work seamlessly with Spade
which offers language extensibility by allowing the implementation of user-
defined built-in operators (UBOPs). When a developer identifies a general-
purpose operation, he can describe it as a new type of stream operator,
effectively extending the Spade language.
Our framework uses UBOPs to extend the language with stream operators
that mimic the faulty behavior of an operator when using a specific PFT
technique. Figure 4.4 shows how the framework operates. First, it receives as
input a Spade application, a target operator, a fault model, and its injection
parameters. Based on the target operator and the fault model, the framework
modifies the Spade program to embed a fault injection operator (FIOP)
in specific positions in the dataflow graph. For example, to emulate tuple
loss at the input ports of an operator, all the operators connected to these
input ports are re-routed to send their output streams to the FIOP. The
FIOP is connected to the target operator. Based on the new flow graph, the
framework generates multiple Spade programs, each of them with a FIOP
configured with a different fault injection parameter. After the compilation,
the application is ready for fault injection runs.
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Figure 4.4: Fault injection framework.
Figure 4.5 depicts how the injection occurs at runtime. The figure shows
the injection of the bursty tuple loss fault model into the input port of oper-
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ator OP2. In this example, OP1 sends tuples containing a stock symbol and
a price to OP2. After the graph pre-processing, OP1 connects to the FIOP,
which connects to OP2. The FIOP is placed right before the target opera-
tor and receives the following parameters: (i) the outage duration, specified
in terms of the number of tuples to be dropped, and (ii) the stream offset,
specified in terms of the number of tuples processed by the operator up until
the fault. In Figure 4.5, the FIOP triggers a fault after it processes the stock
symbol IBM at price USD 123.24. The duration of the fault is two tuples,
leading the FIOP to drop the tuples with stock symbol YHOO and GOOG.
After the FIOP drops the specified number of tuples, its operation goes back
to normal, i.e., forwarding tuples received by OP1 to OP2. Note that the
figure depicts the FIOP for an operator that receives a single stream and
has one input port. For stream operators with two or more ports, there is a
different version of the FIOP with the equivalent number of ports.
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Figure 4.5: Emulation of bursty tuple loss.
Note that our framework does not actually crash and restart an operator
during the injection. Even though the operator continues to run, it does not
send or receive any new tuples for the time corresponding to the fault detec-
tion and recovery. As a result, its internal state (if any) remains unchanged.
This is equivalent to an operator crash and restart from a checkpoint with
its most up-to-date state preserved before the fault.
4.3.2 Placing Injection Operators
To understand how the application behaves under faults, in the worst case we
may need to inject faults in all operators. However, streaming applications
can have a substantially large number of operators. To reduce the number
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of required fault injection targets when evaluating an application, the frame-
work pre-analyzes the dataflow graph. It selects as injection targets only
those operators which are sensitive to the chosen fault model (e.g., operators
which process a single input stream are not sensitive to tuple reordering), or
the injected fault results in a behavior that is different from a fault injected
into another operator in the graph.
For the bursty tuple loss fault model, the inspection starts by selecting all
source operators as injection targets. Injecting faults into the source mimics
a fault affecting the stream feed that originated outside the stream processing
middleware (e.g., the raw sensor data feed) or the source operator itself.
From each source operator, the analysis continues to all downstream op-
erators by doing a breadth-first traversal until the sink is reached. A bursty
tuple loss operator is placed in the dataflow graph immediately before a cho-
sen target operator. The framework selects an operator as a target if its
position in the dataflow graph meets one of the following properties:
1. An upstream operator produces more than one output stream – a com-
mon pattern in streaming applications is for one operator to have its
outputs consumed by more than one operator downstream. As shown
by Figure 4.6(a), both OP2 and OP3 consume the stream produced by
OP1. If OP1 fails, part of its input stream is lost, affecting both OP2
and OP3. If OP2 fails, OP1 can continue to send data to OP3, but all
data sent to OP2 while it is oﬄine is lost. These two different scenarios
can impact the application output in different ways. Therefore, both
scenarios must be emulated when evaluating the application behavior
under faults.
2. The operator consumes more than one input stream – stream operators
can consume outputs produced by more than one upstream operator.
One such example is the join operator, which correlates events coming
from two different streams. This is shown in Figure 4.6(b), where OP1
and OP2 send data to OP3. If OP1 fails, OP3 stops receiving data
from one of its input ports, but it continues to process data coming
from OP2. If OP3 fails, data sent by both OP1 and OP2 are lost.
Since these two scenarios represent two different error modes, both of
them should be emulated during the fault injection experiments.
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3. The upstream operator is stateful – a stream operator can either be
stateful or stateless. For example, an operator that filters a stream
based on the attributes of the current tuple (e.g., a stream attribute
x is less than a value) does not keep any state related to previously
processed tuples. Figure 4.6(c) shows a dataflow graph where a stateless
operator OP1 sends data to a stateful operator OP2, which sends data
to OP3. If OP1 fails, it loses input data from its upstream operator
while it is oﬄine. As a result, OP2 also does not receive input data
during the time OP1 is oﬄine and does not update its internal state.
If OP2 fails, the behavior is analogous to a fault in OP1. OP2 loses its
input data and does not update its internal state while it is recovering.
However, the error behavior changes when OP3 fails. OP3 loses the
input data, but OP2 still updates its internal state. Once OP3 is back
up, OP2 is ready to send up-to-date information and does not spend
any time rebuilding its internal state. These scenarios have different
impacts on the application output, and both must be evaluated.
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Figure 4.6: Placement of bursty tuple loss FIOPs.
Note that if the framework does not select an operator as a fault injection
target, it assumes that the operator error behavior with respect to the appli-
cation output quality is the same as the behavior of its upstream operator.
4.4 Evaluating the Fault Inj ction Outcome
As mentioned in Section 4.2, we evaluate a fault injection outcome based
on an application-specific output sco function (OSF). The O F character-
izes how the application performs, and it can be computed independently
of which stream operator failed. The next sections describe how we handle
the continuous output of streaming applications and how we use the OSF to
compute each of our metrics.
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4.4.1 Handling Continuous Output
Stream processing applications typically produce output results continuously.
If the output is not carefully analyzed, variations in the output due to the
application non-determinism can be confused with the effects of a fault. This
can lead to an overestimation of the faulty effect. We minimize this problem
by limiting which segments of the continuous output stream are analyzed
for estimating the faulty outcome. For example, results produced before the
fault occurrence are ignored when computing the metric.
Figure 4.7 shows an example of a focused segment of the application output
in which part of its tuples is affected by the injected fault. The first top bar
represents the sequence of input tuples of the target operator. The fault is
injected at a given stream offset and with some specified outage duration.
The third bar represents the application output under a faulty run, where
only parts of the tuples are affected by the fault (boxes in red). The QS is
then computed over the tuples identified as affected by the fault on the faulty
output and their pair (if any) on the output generated by the golden run
(boxes in yellow). The first two metrics described in Section 4.4.2 consider
such focused segments of the stream for their computation.
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Figure 4.7: Example of a focused segment of application output with tuples
affected by a injected fault.
Continuous output can also mask the effects of faults. For example, an
application can manifest a fault by missing x alerts (false negative) and
misdetecting y alerts (false positive). When applying an OSF that considers
the total number of detected alerts, the misdetected alerts compensate for
the missed ones. This can erroneously lead the developer to think that the
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fault had low impact on the application output. We minimize this problem
by computing the OSF over local sections of the output stream rather than
once over the complete output set. The last two metrics described in Section
4.4.2 use a local OSF computation.
Figure 4.8 depicts an example of the QS computation over local observa-
tions of the application output. Similarly to Figure 4.7, the first top bar
represents the operator input stream into which the fault is injected. The
third bar shows how the tuples are grouped for the local QS computation.
Note that the local segments of the output contain both tuples that are af-
fected by the fault and tuples that are correct. The QS is computed by
comparing the OSF of the local group of tuples in the faulty output to the
OSF of the matching group in the golden run output. The graph in the
figure shows the QS behavior of the output as the stream progresses (i.e.,
over time). Once the fault is injected, it can cause a perturbation on the
output. However, as more tuples are processed by the application, the oper-
ators recover from the fault and the output stabilizes. The last two metrics
described in Section 4.4.2 use local OSF computations.
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Figure 4.8: Example of local observations of the QS on the application out-
put.
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4.4.2 Evaluation Metrics
Table 4.1 summarizes our evaluation metrics. The first two metrics (Coq
and Doq) indicate the predictability of the stream operator behavior under
faults. An operator that does not have predictable behavior under faults is
not a good target for applying the PFT mechanism under test, because if
such an operator fails in the field, the application outcome is unknown. The
last two metrics (Rlq and I lq) are related to system availability and allow
the assessment of which operators are more critical for the application to
preserve output quality under faults.
Table 4.1: Summary of evaluation metrics.
Metric
Operator
Definition
characteristic
Coq
Outage duration
impact
Correlation coefficient between outage
duration and quality score
Doq Data dependency
Standard deviation and analysis of variance
test of the quality score for different
stream offsets
Rlq Recovery time
P percentile of local quality scores outside
a threshold value
I lq Quality impact Sum of squared errors of local quality score
Outage Duration Impact
By computing the correlation coefficient between outage duration and quality
score (Coq), we can assess the impact of the outage duration, which is one of
the properties of an operator failure (Figure 4.2). If the QS and the outage
duration are highly correlated (i.e., the correlation coefficient is close to 1
or –1), the developer can use off-the-shelf curve fitting methods to find a
function that describes the quality loss in relation to a certain outage. The
developer can feed this function with outage parameters extracted from real
failures in the field and evaluate the risk (in terms of quality degradation) of
using the evaluated PFT technique. If such behavior poses an unacceptable
risk to the application, this operator should be protected against faults.
The Coq metric can be computed in the following way. A fault injection
experiment for a single operator injects faults at m different stream offsets
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using n different outage durations. Each stream offset is referred to as SOi,
where i ∈ [1..m], and each outage duration is referred to as ODj, where
j ∈ [1..n]. For each SOi and ODj, there are p repetitions, where each one
generates an output stream with only a single section affected by the injected
fault. Such a section is estimated based on the SOi and the maximum ODj
value. The OSF for the affected section of the stream is referred to as FOi,j,k,
where k ∈ [1..p].
The average output score function OSFi,j for each ODj and a particular
SOi is computed as
OSFi,j =
∑p
k=1 FOi,j,k
p
(4.1)
The OSF for the golden run is calculated over the section of the output
stream affected by the fault with maximum ODj value
3. The golden run is
executed q times, where each execution generates one GOi,l, where l ∈ [1..q].
The quality score is referred to as QSi,j and is computed as
QSi,j =
OSFi,j
(
∑q
l=1GOi,l)/q
(4.2)
After this step, a particular SOi has n ODj values associated with it and
their corresponding QSi,j results. With these two sets of data, we compute
the Spearman rank correlation coefficient, which assesses whether two sets
of values have a monotonic relationship [87]. This step results in associating
a correlation coefficient CCi with each SOi. Correlation coefficients have
bounds [-1..1].
The operator Coq is then calculated as
Coq =
∑m
i=1CCi
m
(4.3)
Data Dependency
The Doq metric is the standard deviation (σq) and analysis of variance test
(Aq) of the quality score for different stream offsets. This metric evaluates
how the same fault (i.e., the same fault model and outage duration) affects
the output quality when injected at different stream offsets, which is the
3The index j is omitted in all formulas using a single fixed value of ODj .
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other property of an operator failure (Figure 4.2). A high variability in the
application output quality under the same fault indicates data dependency,
i.e., the impact on the output depends on the data being affected by the
fault. An operator with a high σq and a rejected ANOVA test [86] is not
a good candidate for PFT, since the result of a fault in the field is highly
unpredictable. An operator with a low σq and an accepted ANOVA test
indicates that the fault has a similar impact in output quality, independent
of where the fault was injected.
To compute Doq, we first calculate σq, similarly to the Coq metric. The
difference is that we choose the same fixed ODj value for each SOi, instead
of considering all ODj values. As before, we compute the QSi for each SOi.
The σq is then calculated with the standard deviation formula, using the
QSi of each stream offset SOi as data samples.
The analysis of variance Aq is a one-way ANOVA hypothesis test. This test
assesses if there is a statistically significant difference between the observed
means of different groups, where each group is obtained under a distinct
condition [86]. For theDoq metric, the test decides whether the changes in the
stream offset of the injected fault affect the fault’s impact on the application
QS. If H0 (null hypothesis) is accepted, it means that the target operator is
not data dependent. A rejected H0 indicates the opposite. Equation (4.4)
shows the parameters for invoking the ANOVA test that returns an accept
or reject value.
Aq = ANOVA((QS1,1, ..., QS1,k); ...; (QSi,1, ..., QSi,k)), (4.4)
where QSi,k = FOi,k/((
∑q
l=1GOi,l)/q). D
oq is the tuple (σq, Aq).
Recovery Time
The Rlq metric is the P percentile of quality scores outside a threshold value.
This metric estimates how long it takes for the application to recover and to
start producing normal outputs after the occurrence of a fault. The larger
the value of this metric, the larger the impact of an operator failure on the
application availability. As described in Section 4.4.1, this metric assesses
the deviation of the application output quality locally, i.e., by computing the
OSF over different intervals of the output stream (e.g., all tuples produced
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during a 1 second interval). For this metric, an OSF data point is considered
normal when the difference between the faulty OSF and the golden OSF is
less than a certain threshold (e.g., faulty OSF is less than 2% away from the
golden OSF). Any difference greater than the threshold is considered to be an
erroneous output. Our metric considers the coverage of P% of the erroneous
output as it can provide enough accuracy in evaluating the recovery time of
the application.
To compute Rlq, we choose the same single outage duration ODj for all
stream offsets SOi. Each experimental trial k generates one output stream,
which is divided in s sections. For each section, we compute the local OSF,
referred to as LOi,k,t, where t ∈ [1..s]. The average of LOi,k,t over each
experimental trial is referred to as LOi,t, and is computed similarly to Equa-
tion (4.1). A similar procedure is followed for each of the q trials of the
golden run. The OSF for each section of the golden output stream is referred
to as GLOi,l,t. GLOi,t refers to the average of GLOi,l,t over each trial, and is
calculated similarly to Equation (4.1).
In the next step, we build an error array based on LOi,t and GLOi,t, with
t starting at Sbegin, where Sbegin is the section of the output stream produced
after the fault injection. Each position of the array is referred to as EQi,u,
where u ∈ [1..s− Sbegin], and is computed as
EQi,u =
|LOi,t −GLOi,t|
GLOi,t
(4.5)
For simplicity, our definition of EQi,u in this dissertation considers the
absolute value of the error. However, it can also consider the signal of the
error (e.g., output is erroneous only when LOi,t − GLOi,t ≥ 0, and EQi,u is
0 otherwise). Such a condition depends on the semantic of the application,
and should be defined by the developers when evaluating their program.
For each position u in the error array, we compute the number of error
values that are greater than the established threshold up until and including
uth error value EQi,u. This is denoted by NEi,u and is represented formally
as
NEi,u =
u∑
v=1
1[EQi,v > threshold] (4.6)
Then we compute the index Rlqi where P% of the erroneous QS observa-
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tions fall. That is
Rlqi = min u s.t. NEi,u ≥ p ∗NEi,s−Sbegin (4.7)
The final step is to obtain the maximum index for all stream offsets SOi,
that is Rlq = maxi R
lq
i . Picking the maximum allows the assessment of the
risk by considering the worst case manifested during experimentation.
Figure 4.9 shows an example of the Rlq metric. The line with a circle
marker shows the QS values of the faulty run in relation to the golden run
(square marker) for each section of the output stream. The dashed line shows
the allowed error threshold. In this example, the Rlq metric covers 90% (P )
of the data points that lie outside the threshold values (S13) after the fault is
injected, showing an approximation of how long the application output takes
to stabilize after a fault.
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Figure 4.9: Example of the Rlq metric.
Quality Impact
The I lq metric is the sum of squared errors (SSE) of local quality score, which
allows us to compare the fault impact of different operators on the applica-
tion output quality. Similarly to the Rlq, we consider local OSF values that
are outside of a threshold tolerance. The magnitude of the fault impact is
obtained by summing the squares of all local errors throughout the applica-
tion execution after the injection up until the chosen P percentile of the Rlq
metric.
The computation of this metric is similar to the Rlq computation. Instead
of applying Equation (4.6), we calculate the SSE of a single SOi (referred to
as I lqi ) as
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I lqi =
Rlqi∑
v=0
(EQi,v)
2[EQi,v > threshold] (4.8)
I lq is then maxi I
lq
i .
4.5 Experimental Evaluation
Our experimental target is a prototype application from the financial engi-
neering domain called bargain discovery [4]. In our experiments, we assume
the following: (i) a stream operator crash is always detected, (ii) all stateful
operators of the application are being checkpointed [27], and (iii) an operator
restores its state to the state immediately before the fault occurrence.
4.5.1 Target Application
The target application processes stock trades and quotes and outputs in-
formation on all stocks in which there is a potential money gain on buying
the stock at a given time. Figure 4.10 shows the flow graph of the bargain
discovery application.
f(x)  f(x)Source
TradeFilter VWAP
BargainIndex Sink
Aggregator
TradeQuote
f(x)
f(x)
QuoteFilter
Figure 4.10: Stream operator graph of the bargain discovery application.
The application has one Source operator, which reads trades and quotes
events from a file4. Each entry in the file corresponds to a real event from the
stock market. Each entry (tuple) contains a ticker, which is the symbol that
identifies a company on an exchange. The type indicates the action taken
by an investor. A trade action means an investor bought a certain number
(volume) of shares at a specific price. A quote indicates an investor wants to
sell a number (ask size) of stocks at a certain price (ask price).
4In a real-application deployment, data arrives as a continuous stream.
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The processing logic starts with the TradeQuote operator, which reduces
the size of the tuple. Two different operators consume the output stream of
TradeQuote, generating two branches in the application flow graph.
The first branch of the flow graph starts with TradeFilter, which filters
all tuples of type trade. The Aggregator consumes all trades and sums up
the total volume and total price for the five most recent trades of a given
stock symbol. The operator generates a new sum every time a new trade
of the corresponding symbol is processed in the input stream. The VWAP
operator processes the Aggregator output stream and generates a tuple with
the moving average price of a given stock symbol. The second branch of
the flow graph has only the QuoteFilter operator, which outputs only tuples
with type quote.
The processing logic finishes with the BargainIndex, which correlates the
output streams of VWAP and QuoteFilter. For every incoming quote tuple,
it checks for the most recent moving average stock price for the given ticker
symbol. The operator estimates the potential money gain by multiplying
the ask size by the difference between the moving average and the ask price.
All outputs produced by the BargainIndex are stored into a file by the Sink
operator.
For the purpose of fault injection, we modified the application input file
by adding a primary key for each entry of the file. This key follows a strict
ascending order. The application flow graph propagates this key until the
Sink. With such a key, we can precisely identify segments of the faulty output
stream and match them with the equivalent segment of the golden run’s
output stream. This allows an accurate comparison between the application
OSF with and without faults.
4.5.2 Experimental Parameters
The input stream used in our experiments consists of real market trades
and quotes transactions during December 2005. We limited the number
of processed trades and quotes to 5 million events. This dataset has the
following characteristics: (i) the average event rate is 500 tuples/second,
with peak rate of 2200 tuples/second; and (ii) quote transactions account for
80% of input stream events.
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For this experiment, we chose six different outage durations. They are
specified in seconds and have the following values: 0.5, 1, 2, 4, 8, and 16.
The value 0.5 second was estimated by measuring how long it takes the
System S runtime to detect a crashed process and restore it to its normal
operation. The value 16 seconds is the time that the System S runtime
takes to detect that a node has failed and to migrate a stream operator to
a different machine. As described in Section 4.3, the FIOP that emulates
the bursty tuple loss fault model expects as a parameter the outage duration
specified in terms of the number of tuples. Each of the outage duration
values was converted to the number of tuples that would be lost because of
the fault. In this conversion, we used both the average and peak input rate
we observed in our dataset. The average and peak input rates are converted
according to the processing rates of each operator. We used System S built-in
instrumentation features [42] to obtain the processing rates of each operator.
The chosen stream offset trigger values are the following: 0.5, 1.5, 2.5, 3.5,
and 4.5 million. Similarly to the outage duration, we approximate the offset
trigger based on the number of tuples processed by each operator.
Because of the application non-determinism, the golden run was executed
300 times. Each outage duration and stream offset combination was executed
five times, totaling 300 fault injections per operator. The target operators
for this application are Source, TradeFilter, QuoteFilter, VWAP, and Bar-
gainIndex. They are highlighted in Figure 4.10 and were chosen based on the
optimization criteria described in Section 4.3.2. All experiments ran on a sin-
gle node with the Linux operating system, four Intel Xeon 3 GHz processors,
and 8 GB of RAM.
Output score function. We defined the OSF of the application as the
total sum of the financial gain. This application can misbehave in two ways:
(i) underestimating the OSF (QS below 1), i.e., the application fails to in-
dicate opportunities for buying profitable stocks; and (ii) overestimating the
OSF (QS above 1), i.e., the application is estimating that certain stocks are
more profitable than they are in reality. This can lead a trader to make
wrong trading decisions.
We evaluated the OSF sensitivity-to-faults by using a two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov hypothesis test (KS-test) [86]. The H0 of a KS-test is
that both datasets come from the same distribution. In our case, one dataset
comes from the OSF samples of the golden run, while the other dataset comes
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from the OSF samples of the faulty run. A rejected H0 means that the OSF
is sensitive to the injected faults. For the KS-test, we considered the results
of injected faults with maximum outage duration and all target operators. In
addition, we considered the samples obtained from local OSF observations,
i.e., one KS-test for each local OSF. Because at least one KS-test rejected H0
with a level of significance (α) of 0.05, we concluded that the chosen OSF is
sensitive to faults.
4.5.3 Results
Outage duration impact. The Coq metric assesses if the outage duration
caused by a fault in an operator directly impacts the application output
quality. As described in Section 4.4.2, this metric considers only the section
of the output stream that is directly affected by the fault. In the bargain
discovery, we estimate the affected output stream by identifying all trades
that were lost because of the injected fault and all trades that were correlated
with a moving average that was miscalculated because of the injected fault.
For example, when the fault injection target is the Source operator, the
downstream operators lose both trade and quote tuples. In this case, the
affected segment of the output stream considers both the dropped quotes
and the quotes correlated with miscalculated moving averages. However,
when the fault injection target is the QuoteFilter, the affected segment of the
output stream consists only of the dropped quotes. Note that this analysis
is application-specific and should be customized for each application, if a
precise estimate of the affected output stream is desired.
Table 4.2 shows the Coq result for all target operators. Note that the QS
result is highly correlated with the outage duration when faults are injected
into TradeFilter, QuoteFilter, and VWAP.
Figure 4.11 shows how the quality score (QS) varies under different outages
for three operators. The x axis is the outage duration and the y axis is the
QS result. The function f(x) is the result of least-squares fitting of a linear
function. The figure shows the QS data points with faults injected at stream
offset 1.5 million.
For the Source (Figure 4.11(a)) there is an OSF overestimation when the
outage duration is small (less than 5000 tuples), and an OSF underestima-
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Table 4.2: Operator metrics for bargain discovery application.
Operator Coq Doq Rlq I lq
Source –0.38 (0.21,R) 340 21.23
TradeFilter 0.97 (0.76,R) 340 48.70
QuoteFilter –1.00 (0.00,A) 6 6.00
VWAP 0.99 (0.14,R) 73 30.87
BargainIndex –0.69 (0.08,A) 43 7.89
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Figure 4.11: Quality score for fault injection trials with stream offset 1.5 mil-
lion tuples and different outage durations for operators Source, QuoteFilter,
and TradeFilter.
tion when the outage duration increases (greater than 15,000 tuples). When
a fault affects the Source, both trades and quotes are lost. When data loss
is small, not as many quotes are dropped, resulting in many correlations
with a miscalculated moving average. When the data loss is large, the fi-
nancial loss due to not correlating quotes for a long time is greater than the
overestimation due to miscalculated averages.
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Figure 4.11(b) shows the high correlation between QS and outage duration
for the QuoteFilter operator. Note that the QS is 0.00 at the maximum
injected outage duration. The QS is 0.00 because the Coq metric considers
only the affected output stream under the maximum outage duration for its
computation. When we inject a fault into QuoteFilter with the maximum
outage duration, the BargainIndex does not perform correlations with any
quote tuple, and, as a result, the application does not produce any output
during the outage period.
Figure 4.11(c) shows the QS values for the TradeFilter operator. When
this operator fails, the operator that maintains the most recent trades stops
adjusting the moving averages based on new trade values. This can lead to
the evaluation of a non-profitable stock as profitable (case 1) and vice versa
(case 2). In our dataset, the magnitude of case 1 was always greater than case
2. This indicates that the financial loss for buying non-profitable stocks is
greater than the financial loss incurred because purchase opportunities were
missed.
Data dependency. Table 4.2 shows the Doq metric results. A stands
for an accepted Aq, and R stands for a rejected Aq. The operator with the
greatest σq is TradeFilter, and the one with the lowest σq is QuoteFilter. The
only operators with an accepted ANOVA test (i.e., low QS variability under
faults) with α = 0.05 are QuoteFilter and BargainIndex. Figure 4.12 shows
the QS result (y axis) for all injected stream offsets (x axis) under the max-
imum outage duration. The QS for QuoteFilter is 0.00 independently of the
stream offset into which the fault is injected. This is because BargainIndex
cannot do any stream correlation when QuoteFilter fails. For TradeFilter,
the lowest QS is 1.34 and the greatest is 3.35. This represents a considerable
variation, which indicates that the effect of a fault on the QS depends to a
great degree on what data the outage affects.
Recovery time. The Rlq estimates how long the application takes to
produce output below an error threshold once an operator fails. For the
target application, we consider a threshold of 3% away from the OSF of the
golden run. We computed the local OSF values considering the primary key
of the resulting tuple. All tuples with key values falling into an interval of
5000 units are grouped into one stream section (e.g., tuples with keys between
5000 and 10000). This approximates to one local observation at every 2.2
seconds when the input stream is producing tuples at its peak rate. Table 4.2
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Figure 4.12: Quality score for different stream offsets under maximum outage
duration for all target operators.
shows the Rlq for all target operators for an outage duration of 16 seconds
under peak rate. Figures 4.13 and 4.14 show the Rlq value as vectors. The
displayed value is the Rlq for the injected stream offset, and not the maximum
value among all injected stream offsets.
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Figure 4.13: Quality score for each section of the output stream with stream
offset 1.5 million tuples and outage duration of 16 seconds under peak rate.
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(c) Outage of 16 seconds
Figure 4.14: Local quality score observations of the output stream with
stream offset of 3.5 million tuples and different outage durations under peak
rate for TradeFilter.
The operators with highest recovery time are Source and TradeFilter.
These two operators have the same Rlq value because during the injection
trials the same exact set of tuples was dropped with respect to the Aggre-
gator. Additionally, they have the highest Rlq because they both affect the
state of the Aggregator, which maintains the history of the recent trades.
Once new tuples are processed, the Aggregator updates its internal state,
producing moving average estimations with fresh data. As seen in Figures
4.13(a) and 4.14, the QS result stabilizes as more tuples are processed.
The VWAP and BargainIndex operators (Table 4.2) have smaller Rlq val-
ues. When they fail, the state they affect downstream is quicker to rebuild in
comparison to the Source and the TradeFilter. Once BargainIndex recovers
from its checkpoint, its internal state contains outdated moving averages.
However, it immediately starts receiving correct moving average values, al-
lowing correct correlations with new incoming quotes. QuoteFilter has a
small recovery time because it does not affect the state of operators down-
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stream.
Quality impact. The I lq evaluates the magnitude of the impact on the
application output when an operator fails. The outage duration, error thresh-
old, and interval of sections of the output stream are the same ones used by
the Rlq metric. Table 4.2 shows the I lq values for an outage duration of 16
seconds under peak rate. Our results reveal that a fault in TradeFilter affects
the application output the most, while a fault in QuoteFilter has the lowest
impact.
Figure 4.13 shows the QS result (y axis) for every section of the output
stream (x axis) for three target operators. The x axis starts at section 300,
which corresponds to the injection stream offset after 1.5 million tuples have
been processed. Figure 4.13(a) shows the QS for the Source operator. After
the fault injection, there are no tuples present in the output stream, lead-
ing to 100% underestimation of the OSF when compared to the golden run.
Once the operator resumes sending tuples, the application overestimates its
results up to 59% percent. Figure 4.13(b) shows the QS observations for
the QuoteFilter operator. The QuoteFilter has a low I lq because it only
affects the output during the outage period. When faults are injected into
the VWAP operator (Figure 4.13(c)), the application produces high overesti-
mates (up to 113% greater than the golden run OSF). This is because a fault
in VWAP affects the BargainIndex state. As a result, the application contin-
ues to correlate new quotes with outdated moving average values. Note that
when VWAP fails, the history of recent trades maintained by Aggregator is
kept up-to-date. As a result, once VWAP recovers, it can immediately send
up-to-date values downstream.
Figure 4.14 shows the QS for the TradeFilter when subjected to faults at
stream offset after 3.5 million tuples have been processed and with differ-
ent outage durations. Our experiments show that as the outage duration
increases, the peak OSF overestimate for a certain stream offset and the I lq
increases. When the outage lasts 2 seconds (Figure 4.14(a)), the maximum
overestimate is 7% and the I lq is 0.25. For an outage of 8 seconds (Figure
4.14(b)), the maximum overestimate is 72% and the I lq is 12.85. The peak
overestimate for an outage duration of 16 seconds (Figure 4.14(c)) is 144%
and the I lq is 48.70. Our results show that even though the TradeFilter
and Source are losing the same set of tuples under a injected fault with the
same outage duration, the error is higher when the fault is injected into
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the TradeFilter. When TradeFilter fails, new quotes continue to correlate
with an obsolete moving average value. This results in errors with greater
magnitudes.
4.5.4 Discussion
Our results show the following regarding the bargain discovery application:
1. The influence of the operator output stream on the state of the down-
stream flow graph determines the criticality of the operator. The total
state size (in bytes) of operators downstream of a failed operator deter-
mines how long the application takes to fully rebuild its state and for
how long the application produces erroneous results. As a result, oper-
ators with greater influence on the downstream state are more critical
to maintain the application output quality. For example, the Trade-
Filter is the most critical operator with respect to bursty tuple loss,
both in terms of the quality impact and recovery time, making it a
top priority for protection against bursty tuple loss. Even though the
TradeFilter operator is a stateless filter, it directly affects the stateful
Aggregator and BargainIndex downstream. Another example is Quote-
Filter, which is the least critical operator with respect to bursty tuple
loss. This operator has low impact on application output quality, short
recovery time, and very predictable behavior under faults (Aq = accept
and σ = 0.00). Although BargainIndex is stateful and consumes data
from QuoteFilter, the BargainIndex does not keep internal state related
to QuoteFilter’s output stream.
2. Checkpoint is not adequate to protect operators when faults have a long
outage duration. Our results show that checkpointing provides good
protection against faults with short outage duration (e.g., TradeFilter
and Aggregator5 in Figure 4.14(b)), but is not enough for faults with
long recovery time.
3. Position in the flow graph is not an adequate heuristic for deciding
operator criticality. Although other researchers [16, 71] suggest that
5An operator not chosen as fault injection target is assumed to have the same behavior
as its upstream operator (Section 4.3.2).
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the position in the flow graph can be used to deploy PFT, our study
indicates that the position on the flow graph and the type of operator
alone are not adequate heuristics to characterize operator criticality.
Although QuoteFilter and TradeFilter have similar position in the flow
graph and the same operator type, they have very distinct behavior
under faults.
4. The proposed metrics can be used to reconfigure the application fault
tolerance and to observe a measurable improvement in application out-
put quality. Based on our experimental results, we can improve the
fault tolerance of the application by applying, for example, a technique
with lower recovery time, such as high-availability groups (Chapter 5).
This technique maintains active replicas of operator groups of the ap-
plication flow graph. Once an operator in the active group fails, the
backup group becomes active. The failover time from one replica to the
other is at most 2 seconds in System S. Our experiments show that by
replicating a group of critical operators, such as the TradeFilter, Aggre-
gator, and VWAP (shown in Figure 4.15), we can see an improvement
on the output quality of the application under faults. When either
TradeFilter, Aggregator, or VWAP fails, the Rlq is 2 and the I lq is
2. This is a significant improvement when compared to the previous
values (I lq of 48.70 and Rlq of 340). Under faults in the Source and the
TradeQuote, the new I lq is 1.05 and the Rlq is 39, in contrast to an I lq
of 21.23 and Rlq of 340 obtained in our previous tests. For other oper-
ators, such as the QuoteFilter, the metrics show that a simple restart
is enough to maintain good application output quality. This has a
great positive impact on resource utilization for our target application,
given that QuoteFilter has an input selectivity of 80%, as described in
Section 4.5.2.
An important factor in deriving our conclusions was the OSF definition,
which closely follows the semantics of our application. Our experimental
methodology, together with a well-defined OSF, enabled us to make informed
decisions with respect to fault tolerance, since we can evaluate the cost as-
sociated with the applied fault tolerance technique and the benefits such
protection yields. Our results with the bargain discovery application have
also demonstrated robustness to different choices of OSF. We tested both
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Figure 4.15: Re-deployment of bargain discovery.
average financial gain and number of produced tuples as OSFs, and the rel-
ative criticality of operators in terms of I lq and Rlq were similar to the one
obtained by the total sum of financial gain.
4.6 Related Work
Many fault tolerance techniques for streaming applications consider that no
data can be dropped or duplicated [19, 22, 69], which depends upon the
implementation of expensive buffer management and consistency protocols.
These techniques do not evaluate the application output quality when faults
occur, since they assume that the application produces the same output de-
spite the occurrence of faults. Balazinska et al. [64] propose to produce
tentative (lower precision) results during the occurrence of faults. The evalu-
ation of this technique was based on the number of tentative tuples produced
during faults, but there was no evaluation with respect to their impact on
the output quality.
Previous literature on PFT techniques [16, 21, 27, 71, 83] does not describe
how to systematically evaluate the impact of faults on the application output
quality. Bansal et al. [16] assume that the importance of each component
in a streaming application can be described as a linear combination of the
importance of the inputs it is consuming. Our experiments show that this
is not the case for our target application. Zhu et al. [21] assess the output
quality of their proposed fault tolerance method in terms of a sum of squared
errors. We propose three other evaluation metrics.
There is vast research on evaluating fault tolerant systems with fault in-
jection methods [84, 85]. Streaming applications have unique characteristics,
such as non-determinism, and continuous data processing despite the oc-
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currence of faults. This brings up additional challenges to the evaluation
methodology, which cannot be attacked with the techniques described in the
literature.
Our work is related to research in load shedding of streaming applications,
where the stream processing middleware can drop data once it detects that
the system is operating over its capacity. Tatbul et al. [25] study the prob-
lem of using application semantics to drop tuples via a loss-tolerance graph.
This graph can only have stream operators of specific types. Our approach is
independent of operator types. Babcock et al. [24] propose an accuracy met-
ric similar to our QS. We propose four different metrics which are based on
the QS. Previous work [88] considers the operator type to establish a specific
quality metric. Our methodology uses a quality metric that is independent
of the operator type.
Fiscato et al. [89] propose a model for streaming applications with quality
metrics based on the importance of a tuple. The importance of tuples pro-
duced by an operator depends on the importance of its input tuples. Tuples
coming from the same base stream are assumed to be equally important. In
our experiments, this does not hold true. Specifically, although QuoteFilter
and TradeFilter output streams are derived from the same input stream, they
show very different behavior under faults.
4.7 Summary
Partial fault tolerance techniques aim at decreasing their impact on per-
formance of streaming applications by allowing the application to lose and
duplicate data when faults occur. In this chapter, we described a methodol-
ogy and fault injection study to evaluate the impact of using PFT techniques
on the output of a streaming application. The evaluation uses four differ-
ent metrics to characterize how each stream operator in the application flow
graph behaves under faults.
The results show that in the tested application the operator that processes
approximately 80% of the source stream impacts the application output qual-
ity the least. This shows that partial fault tolerance can lead to considerable
decrease in resource consumption and, as a result, better overall application
performance. In addition, the chapter describes how the proposed methodol-
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ogy can be used to learn how to selectively deploy fault tolerance techniques
in the application processing graph.
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Chapter 5
MODELING STREAM PROCESSING
APPLICATIONS
Due to the low latency and high throughput nature of streaming applications,
a variety of low-cost fault tolerance techniques have been proposed in past
years [19, 21, 22, 27, 65]. To understand the benefits of applying a fault
tolerance technique to a given target application, it is critical to evaluate its
effect on the application output, especially considering the differing resource
consumption of alternative techniques and the varying failure rates of distinct
computer systems [90].
Previous research on the evaluation of fault tolerance techniques for
streaming applications has focused mostly on their performance impact [21,
22]. In Chapter 4, we propose the evaluation of the impact of faults on the
application output via fault injection. While fault injection can be applied
directly to the real system and get accurate results, it can be very time con-
suming and expensive to deploy, especially if we consider the many ways
that an application flow graph can fail (e.g., concurrent failures of stream
operators).
In this chapter, we describe a modeling framework to evaluate the de-
pendability provided by different fault tolerance techniques under varying
fault models. The framework considers faults that lead to data loss and data
corruption. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to consider
the problem of data corruption in streaming applications. The error behavior
modeled for both data loss and data corruption follows the behavior observed
in real fault injection experiments. In addition, the proposed framework con-
siders the consequences of error propagation, i.e., the impact that a fault at
one stream operator can have on the downstream operators and on the ap-
plication output. This is an important problem that has not been addressed
by the research community either.
The framework is based on generic models specified with the stochastic ac-
tivity network (SAN) formalism [36], which is ideal for expressing the prob-
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abilistic behavior of faults and parallelism of streaming applications. The
framework provides an abstraction for the key components of a streaming
application: stream operators, stream connections, and tuples. These com-
ponents are then assembled to represent a complete application flow graph
as an SAN. We also define how the fault models under evaluation and their
resulting error propagation are captured in our SAN models. The models for
error propagation are independent of stream operator types and only differ-
entiate them in terms of being stateful or stateless. The fault propagation
mechanism forms the basis of our evaluation of fault tolerance techniques
under different fault models.
Our modeling framework captures the best of the experimental evaluation
world and the best of the model-based evaluation world. By injecting faults
into the application we can learn its behavior as soon as a fault occurs. By
retrofitting such behavior into a model, we can observe how faults can affect
the application in terms of metrics that require a long observation time (e.g.,
availability) and better understand the risk of a fault when given realistic
fault distributions.
We use our framework to evaluate the effectiveness of three different fault
tolerance techniques, namely checkpointing [27], high-availability groups, and
full replication [22]. The experiments with faults that cause data loss show
that high-availability groups have a great advantage in maintaining the accu-
racy of the application output when compared to checkpointing. In addition,
the results show that faults that lead to data corruption can break the no data
duplication guarantee provided by the modeled full replication technique.
The current implementation of the framework assumes that different
stream operators fail and recover independently. It also considers a generic
representation for all operators, without any specialization for different oper-
ator types. We consider that extending the model both to force the parallel
failure of more than one operator and to further specialize the model for
different operator types is trivial. More details on developing more precise
models for specific operator types can be found in Appendix A.
The main contributions of this chapter are (i) a framework with generic
models to compose streaming applications and to evaluate the dependabil-
ity and resource consumption trade-offs provided by different fault tolerance
techniques and under different fault models; (ii) a characterization of how
errors affecting a stream operator can propagate to other stream operators
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on the processing graph, which considers the probabilities that the stream
connections of an application are used and the state size of stateful operators
in the application; and (iii) an extensible framework to test new fault toler-
ance techniques before deployment and compare their behavior with existing
approaches.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 provides a brief description
of the SAN formalism. Section 5.2 describes the application model and its
mapping to the SAN formalism. The fault and error propagation models are
discussed in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. Sections 5.5 and 5.6 show how we added
different fault tolerance techniques to the framework and their evaluation.
Sections 5.7 and 5.8 discuss model validation experiments and some limita-
tions of our framework. Section 5.9 describes related work, and Section 5.10
concludes the chapter.
5.1 Stochastic Activity Networks
Our modeling framework uses the SAN formalism [36] to model stream pro-
cessing applications and the occurrence of failure events. SANs are a variation
of stochastic Petri nets [91] and have been used to evaluate the performance
and dependability of many complex systems [92, 93, 94].
Informally, the basic constructs of SANs are the following:
1. Place - a place contains a natural number of tokens and can represent,
for example, a possible state of the modeled system. Places are represented
graphically as a circle.
2. Activity - an activity indicates transitions between places. An activ-
ity can be timed or instantaneous. A timed activity expresses how long a
transition takes to complete and can be described as a random variable.
An instantaneous activity expresses a transition that takes a non-significant
amount of time to complete with respect to the modeled system. Activities
can have a set of cases, which are used to model the possible outcomes of a
transition. Timed activities are graphically represented by ovals, while in-
stantaneous activities are represented by bars. Cases are depicted as small
circles attached to the activity representation.
3. Token - a token is an item residing in a place and is depicted as a dot.
4. Input gates - input gates enforce a condition for an activity to be enabled
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and are illustrated as a left triangle (/).
5. Output gates - output gates allow the execution of a function after the
completion of an activity. Output gates can be used to update the state of
the model. These gates are depicted as a right triangle (.).
For a formal definition of SAN, refer to Sanders and Meyer’s earlier work
[36].
5.2 Application Model
This section describes the streaming application model considered by the
framework. The later subsections describe the abstractions provided for
stream operators, stream connections, and tuples. In addition, we detail
how each of these components is mapped into the SAN formalism.
A streaming application is a directed dataflow graph G = 〈O,C〉. The
vertices O represent a set of stream operators. Each stream operator o ∈ O
has an associated number of input ports pC〈o〉 ∈ Z∗ and a number of output
ports pB〈o〉 ∈ Z∗.
The directed edges C represent a set of stream connections. Each connec-
tion c = (〈o, k〉, 〈o′, k′〉) ∈ C connects an operator output port (kth output
port of operator o ∈ O, where k ∈ [1..pB〈o〉]) to an operator input port (k′th
input port of operator o′ ∈ O, where k′ ∈ [1..pC〈o′〉]). An item flowing through
a stream connection c is called a tuple and is denoted by τ〈c〉,m, where m
represents the index of the tuple in the stream connection c ∈ C. The set of
all tuples for a given connection c is denoted by τ〈c〉.
An operator o with no input ports (pC〈o〉 = 0) is called a source operator.
A source operator channels data directly from a raw data source (e.g., video
camera) maintained by a component outside the stream processing graph.
For a non-source operator o, we denote the set of incoming connections on
its input port i ∈ [1..pC〈o〉] as CC〈o〉,i. Formally,
CC〈o〉,i = {(〈o′, k′〉, 〈o′′, k′′〉) ∈ C : o′′ = o ∧ k′′ = i}.
In other words, CC〈o〉,i ⊂ C defines the set of stream connections attached
to the ith input port of operator o. Each input port is associated with a
processing logic function F〈o〉,i. This function is characterized with a tuple
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processing cost function f〈o〉,i defined as
f〈o〉,i : ∪c∈CC〈o〉,iτ〈c〉 → R
+.
For each port, we also define an average processing cost per tuple d〈o〉,i as
d〈o〉,i =
∑
c∈C〈o〉,i
∑|τ〈c〉|
m=1 f〈o〉,i(τ〈c〉,m)∑
c∈C〈o〉,i |τ〈c〉|
.
The operator invokes F〈o〉,i every time there is a tuple available in any of the
stream connections associated with CC〈o〉,i. As a result, the average processing
cost d〈o〉,i considers tuples from all connections in CC〈o〉,i.
An operator o with no output ports (pB〈o〉 = 0) is called a sink operator. A
sink operator stores its results into a component outside the stream process-
ing graph (e.g., database).
For a non-sink operator o, we denote the set of outgoing connections of its
output port j ∈ [1..pB〈o〉] as CB〈o〉,j. Formally,
CB〈o〉,j = {(〈o′, k′〉, 〈o′′, k′′〉) ∈ C : o′ = o ∧ k′ = j}.
In other words, CB〈o〉,j ⊂ C defines the set of stream connections attached to
the jth output port of operator o.
We define the set of operators connected to an input port i of operator o
as OC〈o〉,i. Formally,
OC〈o〉,i = {o′ ∈ O : (〈o′, k′〉, 〈o′′, k′′〉) ∈ C ∧ o′′ = o ∧ k′′ = i}.
The set of operators connected to all input ports of an operator is denoted
as OC〈o〉 = ∪
pC〈o〉
i=1O
C
〈o〉,i. We also define the set of all operators in the upstream
of an operator o as
UC〈o〉 =
{} if p
C
〈o〉 = 0
OC〈o〉 ∪
⋃
o′∈OC〈o〉 U
C
〈o′〉 otherwise.
Finally, we define the set of operators on the upstream of a specific input
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port i of operator o as
UC〈o〉,i =
{} if p
C
〈o〉 = 0
OC〈o〉,i ∪
⋃
o′∈OC〈o〉,i U
C
〈o′〉 otherwise.
5.2.1 Stream Operators
To represent an operator o using the SAN formalism, we first consider its
input stream connections, CC〈o〉 = ∪
pC〈o〉
i=1C
C
〈o〉,i. For each input stream connec-
tion c ∈ CC〈o〉, we generate a corresponding place in the SAN. These places
are labeled as input stream connection. Figure 5.1 shows an example where
we have two input stream connections. The tuple handling within an oper-
ator is modeled in three stages, namely waiting, processing, and sending. In
the waiting stage, the operator waits for input from any of the input stream
connections. This is achieved by connecting all the input stream connection
places to a single input gate (IG1). The input gate is also connected to a
place labeled waiting for input, as shown in Figure 5.1. Once there is data
available, the input gate (IG1) enables the transition out of the waiting for
input place and the operator moves to the processing stage. For this stage,
we create pC〈o〉 places, one for each input port. These places are labeled as
processing tuple and are connected to the input gate IG1 via an activity as
shown in Figure 5.1. The processing stage considers selectivity1 to determine
if a new tuple should be sent out or not. This behavior is modeled by an
activity with two cases on the tuple processing transition. If there is no out-
put to be generated, the operator waits for new input data by transitioning
back to the waiting for input place, in which case we go back to the wait-
ing stage. The processing stage also considers average processing cost d〈o〉,i
for each processing tuple place. This cost is used as the activity parameter
and can be obtained by profiling the modeled application [42]. If there is
an output to be generated, the operator moves to the sending stage. For
the sending stage, pB〈o〉 places are created (one for each output port). These
places are labeled as sending output, as shown in Figure 5.1. The operator
1Selectivity is generally used for operators with predicates, such as filters and join.
In this work, we use selectivity to represent the ratio average number of output tuples
per second in an output port/average number of input tuples per second in an input port
produced by any operator type.
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transitions from a processing tuple place to a sending output place through
the cases defined on the activity connecting the two. The operator stays
in the sending output place until there is available space in the operating
system’s protocol stack buffer for data transmission (enforced by an input
gate (IG2)). This emulates the possible back pressure caused by downstream
operators. Furthermore, an additional place for each output port is added to
represent the output buffer for the port. These places are labeled as output
buffer as shown in Figure 5.1. The input gate IG2 is connected to the output
buffer places through an activity and an output gate OG1. The output gate
is also connected to the waiting for input place. The output gate is used
to submit the tuple to the output buffer and immediately go back to the
waiting stage by transitioning to the waiting for input place. Only a single
output gate is used per output port. Each output stream connection c ∈ CB〈o〉
is also mapped to a place. These places are labeled as output stream connec-
tions. The output stream connection places associated with a given output
port (i.e., CB〈o〉,j where j ∈ [1..pB〈o〉]) are connected to the output port’s output
buffer place. Figure 5.1 shows an example for a single output connection.
input stream 
connections processing tupleIG1
waiting for input
sending output
output stream
connection
output 
buffer
 
IG2OG1
Figure 5.1: SAN for a stream operator with two input connections on a single
input port and one output stream connection on a single output port. Model
captures three tuple processing stages (waiting, processing, and sending),
operator selectivity, and tuple transmission to output stream connection.
5.2.2 Stream Connections
Stream connections represent the intercommunication channels between op-
erators executing in different processes or nodes of a distributed system. We
represent stream connections by composing stream operator models via the
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replicate/join formalism [95]. This formalism allows places in different mod-
els to be shared, effectively allowing communication between the composed
models. Stream connections are modeled as the state sharing between the
output stream connection place of one operator and the input stream connec-
tion place of another operator. In the composed model, we create one shared
pair input and output stream connection for each c ∈ C. Because places are
shared, once a token is written into an output stream connection place of one
operator, it is immediately visible in the input stream connection place of
the next operator.
A single composed model with all stream interconnections represents the
application dataflow graph, as shown by the example in Figure 5.2. This
example shows the equivalent composed model for the application segment
given in Figure 5.3. This application segment, written in Spade has three
operators, mapping to a composed model with three base stream operator
models and two stream interconnections.
op1
op1
op
op3
s1
s2op2
op3
s2
s1
2
Figure 5.2: Example of composed model equivalent to the streaming appli-
cation depicted in Figure 5.3. The sharing of output stream places of op1
and op2, and input stream places of op3 models the interconnection between
operators.
5.2.3 Tuples
We represent each tuple τ〈c〉,m as a token that transitions through the oper-
ators via the stream connections. Tokens placed in input stream connection,
output stream connection, or output buffer place model tuples residing in
communication queues of the operating system or the stream operator itself.
Tuple processing within an operator is modeled by removing a token from
the input stream connection place and optionally adding a token (after the
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stream OP1(tag: String, company: String, article: String)
:= Functor(CNNSource)
[tag = "technology"]{}
stream OP2(tag: String, company: String, article: String)
:= Functor(FoxNewsSource)
[tag = "technology"]{}
stream OP3(company:String, article: String)
:= Functor(OP1, OP2)
[company = "IBM"]{}
Figure 5.3: Synthetic streaming application coded in Spade containing three
operators. OP1 and OP2 consume data from external sources (CNNSource and
FoxNewsSource) and filter for articles related to technology. OP3 consumes
the output of both OP1 and OP2, filtering for articles related only to IBM.
processing time) to the output stream connection place. The token is written
to the output stream connection place according to the specified operator
selectivity (Section 5.2.1). Discarded tuples are seen as tokens that are ef-
fectively removed from the model execution. Note that the tokens placed in
stream connection and output buffer places are the only ones that represent
application data. All other tokens in the model represent the state in which
each operators is (e.g., waiting, processing).
In our framework, source operators are not connected to any upstream
operators and, as a result, have no data to consume. We represent external
sources by adding an activity that fires according to a random variable with
a configurable statistical distribution. The distribution describes the inter-
arrival time of tuples into one of the source operators feeding the application.
Once this activity fires, we insert a token into the input stream connection
places of all source operators consuming data from the same external source.
This token is then transmitted to all downstream operators, until it reaches
one of the application sinks. For this purpose, all source operator models are
augmented with an input stream connection place, even though they do not
have input ports.
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5.3 Fault and Failure Model
For a streaming application to achieve maximum data throughput and mini-
mum end-to-end latency, the stream processing graph can be distributed over
a set of computing nodes. Each operator or set of operators can be mapped
to a process that can run on different nodes of a distributed system.
Our fault model assumes that different stream operators can fail indepen-
dently or concurrently. The cause of failure can be a node crash (e.g., device
driver error leads to kernel crash), a Heisenbug (e.g., race condition), or a
hardware transient error (e.g., error affects ALU output).
One possible outcome of a fault is a clean crash of the operator. A clean
crash means that even though the fault has led to an operator failure, it did
not result in any erroneous output value being produced and the operator
state stored in the checkpoint file [19, 27] (if any) was not corrupted. The
consequences of a clean crash can vary depending on the fault tolerance
technique being used. Many techniques aim to guarantee no data loss under
operator crashes [19, 22, 65]. On the other hand, partial fault tolerance
techniques [21, 27] favor improved runtime-performance over a no data loss
guarantee. When failures occur under these schemes, both the data present
in the communication channels and the data being processed by the operator
at the time of failure may not be recoverable.
Another possible outcome of a fault in an operator is a silent data cor-
ruption (SDC). SDC is the result of a fault that goes undetected but cor-
rupts parts of the application data. Previous works have shown that a non-
negligible percentage of transient hardware faults lead to the corruption of
the application output [96]. Dixit et al. [97] indicate that transient error rates
may increase as the microprocessor feature size decreases. As a result, data
corruption becomes a significant problem to be handled by the application
layer. To the best of our knowledge, all fault tolerance techniques proposed
for streaming applications [19, 21, 22, 27, 65] assume a fail-stop fault model,
which does not always hold true [98]. In stream operators, hardware errors
can affect the internal state of the operator and the attribute values of a
tuple.
Similarly to stream operators, we consider both clean crashes and SDC for
the stream sources. Crashes affecting stream sources can lead to data loss
even when the fault tolerance technique applied to the application guarantees
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no data loss. Although the streaming middleware can control the execution of
stream operators and maintain enough redundant execution context and state
for recovering the application, it cannot control the availability of external
sources. With our model, the developer can assess the effects of such faults
on the application.
5.4 Error Propagation Model
To accurately evaluate the fault impact on the application output, our frame-
work models error propagation. This allows us to capture the effects that a
fault in one operator can have in other operators. For example, if an op-
erator corrupts a tuple because of a fault, this tuple can spread to all con-
nected operators and eventually reach the application output. We model the
probability that a corrupted tuple reaches the output based on operators’
selectivities and the state size of stateful operators. In this section we detail
how we augment our base model (Section 5.2) to include operator failures
and propagation of errors. We describe the model extensions for both clean
crashes and SDCs.
In our framework, we refer to tuples affected by a fault as tainted tuples. A
tainted tuple (i) may have attribute values different than it would have during
a fault-free execution, or (ii) may be generated under a predicate evaluation
that uses corrupted data and/or a corrupted internal state. Tainted tuples
can have attribute values that are approximate to its fault-free values and
thus be tolerable by a given application. The proposed model operates over
tokens that have no value and, as a result, does not capture the degree to
which a tuple is tainted.
To differentiate between correct and tainted tuples, we augment the stream
operator model described in Section 5.2.1 to include the generation and prop-
agation of tainted tuples under faulty conditions. To distinguish correct tu-
ples from tainted ones, we create an extra stream interconnection for each
connection c ∈ C in the application. These extra connections, called tainted
stream connections, only carry tainted tuples. Once the operator consumes
a tuple from a tainted connection, it goes through state transitions that may
lead to the production of one or more new tainted tuples. To model er-
ror propagation, we distinguish whether an operator is stateless or stateful.
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Any other specific operator semantic is ignored. Figure 5.4 shows an exam-
ple SAN model for a stateless operator that includes additional places for
tainted stream connections. The example includes an extra processing state,
which depicts the processing of tainted tuples. The next sections describe the
conditions under which operators might generate tainted tuples based on the
fault model under evaluation.
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Figure 5.4: Extended SAN for a stateless stream operator with a single in-
put and output stream connection. Model includes extra places to represent
operator interconnection via tainted streams connections, allowing the prop-
agation of tainted tuples.
5.4.1 Operator Crash Failure
A stream operator crash can result in data loss. Data loss can affect the
internal state of stream operators, leading to inaccurate application output.
To evaluate the extent to which the data loss affects the application outcome,
we analyze the conditions under which operators can generate corrupted data.
Our analysis is based on the fault injection experiments described in Chap-
ter 4. These experiments emulate operator crashes via a bursty data loss
fault model and evaluate the deviation of the application output under faulty
conditions.
In our framework, an operator crash is modeled via a failure activity that
transitions from an alive state to a crashed state. This transition follows
an exponential distribution2 with a constant rate of λc failures per second.
After the failure activity fires, all data (i.e., tokens) in the input and output
2Analysis of field failure data has shown that exponential distribution is a good enough
approximation of real failure rates [99].
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buffers of the operator are discarded. While in crashed mode, the operator
does not receive or send any tuple. After the failure, the operator transitions
again to an alive state via a recovery activity. This activity is parameterized
with the average recovery time of an operator. Once the operator is alive,
it restarts to process input data. Depending on the operator behavior under
crashes, the data it sends out can be either a correct or a tainted tuple.
To model the behavior of a stream operator o under data loss, we classify
the operator into the following categories: (i) stateless, where all functions
F〈o〉,i associated to pC〈o〉 input ports decide their outcome solely based on the
current tuple being processed (e.g., filter); and (ii) stateful, where at least
one function F〈o〉,i associated to pC〈o〉 input ports maintains any data based
on the previously processed tuples and uses such data to compute attribute
values of the output tuple (e.g., window-based join).
Stateless operators. When a stateless operator crashes, it can still gener-
ate correct tuples from its input streams after a restart. As a result, stateless
operators do not generate tainted tuples after a crash and restart.
If stateless operators receive tainted tuples from their input streams, the
operator may send out a tainted tuple (i.e., propagate the error). As shown
in Figure 5.4, we add an extra processing state to process tainted tuples. The
corrupted value of tainted tuples can also affect the selectivity of the operator.
For example, tuples that normally would not pass a filter predicate can pass
the filter because of a corrupted attribute value. This behavior is modeled by
adding an activity with a variation on the original case probabilities values
defined by the operator selectivity.
Stateful operators. If a stateful operator crashes, there may be both
data loss in its input ports and total [65] or partial loss [27] of its internal
state. Once the operator restarts, its state is different from the state it would
have in a failure-free run. Figure 5.5 shows how we model the operator
timeline in this situation. We consider that the operator produces tainted
tuples until the internal state of the operator stabilizes and can output tuples
with approximate or perfect results. We model this behavior by changing
the state of the operator to an unstable mode once it crashes and restores.
While the operator is in an unstable mode, all the tuples that it produces
are tainted. Once the operator stabilizes its internal state, it transitions to
a stable mode and can again produce correct tuples. We assume that the
duration of the unstable period lasts until a certain number of correct tuples
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is processed (e.g., full window size). Section 5.5 provides more details on how
we established the stabilization time for the modeled techniques.
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Figure 5.5: Timeline for a stateful stream operator under a data loss fault
model. Once the operator crashes and restores, the operator runs under
an unstable mode and produces tainted tuples. After processing tuples and
stabilizing its internal state, the operator produces non-tainted tuples.
Another situation in which a stateful operator o produces tainted tuples
is when an operator in the upstream set of input port i (i.e., o ∈ UC〈o〉,i)
associated to a F〈o〉,i that maintains state crashes. As shown in Figure 5.6,
a fault in an operator that is in the upstream set (i.e., filter with predicate
int < 9) of a port with a stateful function (i.e., aggregation) can affect the
operator’s internal state. The example shows a filter operator at time t1 and
an operator with a sliding aggregation window of size 4 at time t2. In Figure
5.6(a), the operator slides its window after consuming the incoming tuples (5
and 2). After that, the operator sums up the current values of the window
and generates an output tuple (16). Figure 5.6(b) shows the execution when
the filter crashes at time t1. Because of the crash, the tuples with value 5 and
2 are dropped. As a result, the aggregator does not slide its internal window.
The window slides only after the filter recovers at time t2 and sends tuples
1, 8 and 5. As the figure shows, the aggregator ends up generating tuples
with different values (12 and 18) than the fault-free scenario. Similarly to
the stateful operator crash scenario, we consider that the operator also has
to process a certain number of incoming tuples to stabilize its internal state
after an upstream operator crash.
The last situation that a stateful operator may generate tainted data is
when it receives a tainted tuple from an upstream operator. In contrast with
a stateless operator, when a stateful operator receives a tainted tuple on
a port i with F〈o〉,i that maintains state, the operator internal state gets
tainted, potentially leading to the generation of multiple tainted tuples until
the stabilization of its state. We expect that the stabilization time due to
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(b) Operation when upstream operator crashes
Figure 5.6: Example of an upstream operator crash that impacts the in-
ternal state of a stateful operator downstream. Even though the stateful
operator does not crash, its internal state ends up with a different content
when compared to a fault-free run.
a tainted tuple is shorter than the stabilization time due to tuple loss. The
intuition is that a bursty loss of data affects more tuples than a single tainted
tuple. Note that this stabilization time is also a parameter in our model. If
this assumption does not hold for a certain application, the stabilization time
can be adjusted accordingly.
5.4.2 Operator Silent Data Corruption Failure
To understand and properly model SDC in stream operators, we conducted
fault injection experiments on a real application to gather data on how the
SDC manifests in terms of tainted tuples produced by a faulty operator.
We used SymPLFIED [100], a symbolic fault injector, to carry on the mea-
surements. Two stream operators were used as fault injection targets: (i) a
stateless filter that consumes data from a single input stream and sends data
to a single output stream. We observed that many injection runs resulted in
the corruption of a single tuple on the operator output; and (ii) a stateful ag-
gregator that computes a sum over a sliding window of size 5. SymPLFIED
found injection runs where both single and multiple tuples were corrupted
on the operator output.
SDC is modeled by transitioning an operator from an error-free state to
an error state. The activity follows an exponential distribution with a fault
rate of λs faults per second. The λs value considers only faults that lead to
an SDC.
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Stateless operator. The outcome of a fault in a stateless operator is to
generate one tainted output tuple. The processing stage of a corrupted tuple
can have a different selectivity than the processing of a correct tuple. An
extra activity in the model with case probabilities different than the original
processing activity models different selectivity values under faults. Stateless
operators also propagate tainted tuples coming from its tainted input stream
connections. Error propagation occurs according to the selectivity of tainted
tuples.
Stateful operator. A fault in a stateful operator can cause the genera-
tion of one or more tainted tuples. If the error leads to the corruption of a
single tuple, the operator sends a tainted tuple to its tainted output streams
connections. If the error leads to the corruption of the internal state, the
operator sends tainted tuples until its internal state stabilizes.
If the operator receives tainted tuples in a port associated with a function
F〈o〉,i that maintains state, it also considers the generation of tainted tuples
until its internal state stabilizes. Figure 5.7 shows an example of an SDC of
a tuple processed by a stateless filter at time t1. The figure also shows the
aggregator at time t2, after consuming tuple 3 and the tainted tuple. The
erroneous tuple taints the internal state of the operator, resulting in multiple
erroneous tuples.
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Figure 5.7: Hardware transient fault affects the filter operator, generating
a corrupted output tuple. The error propagates to the Aggregator, which
consumes an erroneous tuple and stores it in its internal window. Corrupted
tuples spread to multiple output stream connections.
5.5 Modeling Fault Tolerance Techniques
In this section, we show how our framework can be extended to model the
following three fault tolerance mechanisms: checkpointing of operator state
[27], partial replication via high-availability groups, and a full replication-
based approach [22]. We provide a summary of each technique and how it is
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mapped to the SAN formalism.
5.5.1 Checkpointing of Operator State
Checkpointing of operator state (Chapter 3 and [27]) is a lightweight fault
tolerance technique developed on top of Spade. This technique allows the
developer to configure the fault tolerance applied to the application by se-
lectively annotating the stream operator processing graph. For every an-
notated operator, the Spade compiler automatically generates specialized
checkpointing code based on the operator type and instance. The System
S runtime asynchronously invokes this checkpointing code at the frequency
specified together with the annotation. Because the operator checkpoint is
not updated at every processed tuple, the checkpointed state is slightly out-
dated with respect to the operator state right before the crash. In addition,
every time a stream operator crashes, its upstream operators discard all out-
going tuples, causing a bursty tuple loss. This solution favors performance
and application output timeliness over precise computation of every output
tuple.
Our checkpointing model considers crash failures by adding a heartbeat
monitor for each stream connection c of the application. Similarly to streams,
the heartbeat is modeled by adding shared variables via the replication/join
formalism. The shared variable lets an operator o monitor the alive state
(Section 5.4.1) of all operators connected to its output ports. Once the
operator detects a crash, it immediately starts discarding all outgoing tuples.
If the operator has more than one output stream connection, it stops sending
data only to the failed one. This follows the implementation of one of System
S’ operator intercommunication protocols [29, 30]. This behavior should be
changed if the intercommunication protocol uses buffers to hold tuples and
avoid tuple loss [65]. In our model, this can be done by changing the function
associated to an output gate.
For all stateless operators of an application, our model assumes that there
is no checkpoint from which to recover. For stateful operators, we consider
checkpointing only for operators annotated in the target application. If the
operator is not annotated, it assumes it restarts from scratch. This means
that after a restart, the operator does not send output tuples at its full output
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rate (i.e., sends tuples with a lower selectivity) until it is stable. After the
stabilization time, the operator resumes its normal behavior. In this study,
the stabilization time is equal to the number of tuples corresponding to a
full operator state (e.g., window size). During the stabilization time, the
operator does not send tuples as tainted. Because the operator is starting
from scratch, we consider that whatever it produces is correct, similarly to
when the real streaming application is starting from scratch. Note, however,
that this situtation can still result in tainted tuples in the application output.
If there are stateful operators downstream, they may start to produce tainted
tuples because of an upstream failure, as described in Section 5.4.1.
For stateful operators, we model the number of tuples to be processed until
stabilization with the following formula:
Z〈o〉,i = min(α× S〈o〉,i + β × L〈o〉,i, γ × S〈o〉,i).
The number of tuples to be processed until stabilization, denoted as Z〈o〉,i,
depends on two components in our model. First is the state size, denoted as
S〈o〉,i, and second is the total number of tuples that were lost since the last
checkpoint, denoted as L〈o〉,i. The value for L〈o〉,i can be estimated based on
the age of the last checkpoint and the tuple rate for input port i. We use a
linear combination of these two components to estimate Z〈o〉,i. We use the
weights α and β to scale the two components. The former is called the state
penalty factor, and the latter is called the state staleness factor. We also
limit the maximum value Z〈o〉,i can take using a constant factor on the state
size, called state cap factor, denoted as γ. The impact of propagated errors is
estimated only by considering a state penalty factor over the state size. Note
that this formula is an approximation of the behavior observed in our fault
injection experiments with data loss in a streaming application (Chapter 4).
If this does not hold for a given target application, the developer can change
this parameter in our model accordingly.
The occurrence of hardware transient errors that cause silent data cor-
ruption can also be added to the checkpointing model. Gu et al. [101] have
shown that a significant number of transient errors can take more than 1 mil-
lion CPU cycles to be detected. Long latency failures can lead to checkpoint
corruption. This means that even in the case of an operator crash and re-
store from a checkpoint, the checkpoint can contain a corrupted state. In our
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modeling framework, this could be added by marking a checkpointed state
as tainted if the checkpointing activity is triggered and the internal operator
state is tainted. We do not consider this in our model because we already
consider that checkpointed stateful operators generate tainted tuples upon
restore because of data loss. However, this can be considered when modeling
fault techniques that use checkpointing but still guarantee no data loss [19].
5.5.2 High-Availability Groups
High-availability (HA) groups is a fault tolerance technique implemented in
the Spade compiler that allows an annotated set of interconnected operators
of a stream processing graph to be replicated during runtime. Each set of
interconnected operators is referred to as a group. There is no determinism
enforced between the replicas of a group.
When Spade replicates a group of operators, one of the replicas is config-
ured as active, and the others are configured as backups. While both active
and backup replicas consume and process their input streams, only the tuples
produced by the active replica are consumed by the operators downstream.
Tuples produced by the farthest downstream operator of the backup sub-
graphs (also called the group edge) are discarded. When any operator in the
active replica fails, the backup replica detects the fault (via the absence of
heartbeats) and starts sending its tuples to the operators downstream. This
technique can cause tuple loss during the failover time.
To model the HA groups technique, we first replicate the base model of
each operator annotated to be in an HA group and then add all these base
models to the composed model of the application. The replicated operators
are interconnected following the same flow of the original stream processing
graph.
To trigger the failover between active and backup replicas, we add to the
model a heartbeat (via shared variables) for each operator selected to be
in an HA group. These heartbeats are monitored by each group edge of
an HA group (one edge for each replica). The group edge is responsible to
trigger failover and replica deactivation activities depending on the liveness
condition of the replicated operators. The failover activity is parameterized
according to the average failover time between replicas. As in our implemen-
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tation in Spade, only one replica is active at a time, while all others are in
backup mode.
Similarly to the checkpoint model, we add a heartbeat monitor for each
each stream connection c ∈ C of the application. The operator model dis-
cards output tuples if the heartbeat indicates that the downstream operator
has failed. In addition, we add extra heartbeats (via shared variables) for
groups of operators that were selected to be in an HA group. For all the group
edges of an HA group (one group edge for each replica), we append a model
similar to the one described in Figure 5.8. Each group edge monitors all op-
erators participating in that group, both from the active and backup replicas.
The failover and deactivate activities are triggered based on the liveness con-
dition of the operators participating in the HA group. The failover activity
is parameterized according to the average failover time between replicas. As
in our implementation in Spade, only one group edge starts in the active
mode, while all other copies of the same group are set to be in the backup
mode.
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Figure 5.8: SAN for an HA group of two operators and two replicas. Places
associated to operators (op1,A, op2,A, op1,B, and op2,B) indicate whether each
operator is alive. Active replica deactivates upon detection of a failed op-
erator. Backup replica triggers a failover upon the crash of an operator of
the active replica. Tokens displayed in the figure indicate that the replica is
active and all monitored operators are alive.
For all non-annotated operators, our model assumes that the operators
have no replica and restart from scratch after a crash. Stateful operators
in the HA group are also assumed to restart from scratch, unless annotated
with a checkpoint capability. Although an operator in an HA group may
produce tainted tuples upon restart, these tainted tuples do not propagate
down the graph if the replica is not active. Generation of tainted tuples by
the active replica can only occur if there are simultaneous failures in both
replicas, and the active replica ends up with an operator in an unstable state.
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Following the model described for tuple loss in Section 5.4.1, a stateful
operator in a graph with HA group annotations can still produce tainted
tuples upon the crash of an upstream operator. However, the difference
here is that some operators are replicated. As a result, operators in the HA
group only start producing tainted tuples when a non-replicated operator
in its upstream crashes or when there is no active replica for an HA group
contained in the upstream set (e.g., during failover time). In such cases, the
operator produces tainted tuples until its stabilization time. We model the
number of tuples to be processed until stabilization using the same formula
introduced for the checkpoint technique.
5.5.3 Full Replication
Hwang et al. [22] propose a technique based on full replication of the stream
processing graph.Each operator replica sends its output to all operator repli-
cas downstream. This technique guarantees no tuple loss and no tuple dupli-
cation upon crashes by making all operators deterministic and by dedupli-
cating tuples coming from redundant streams. If an operator sees a tuple for
the first time, it immediately sends the tuple downstream and stores its value
in an internal table. Operators discard all tuples detected as duplicates. The
operator internal table is periodically cleaned by punctuation marks3 sent by
source operators at a specified interval.
To add this technique to our base model, we first replicate all operators
except the sources and sinks. For each replicated operator in the application,
we add one extra operator to the composed model. We then add extra regular
and tainted streams to fully interconnect the replicated graph, as shown in
Figure 5.9 by the dashed lines. During the model simulation, the operator
writes tokens to both the original and replicated streams.
To model tuple deduplication, we add one extra place per incoming stream.
This extra place counts how many tuples are received in each stream. When
a tuple arrives to an operator input stream, it checks if the number of tuples
received from this stream is less or equal to the number of tuples received
from the redundant stream. If this predicate evaluates to true, the operator
considers the tuple a duplicate and discards it. The operator cleans up all of
3A punctuation is special mark that can be included in a stream.
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Figure 5.9: Operator graph for the full replication technique. Dashed arrows
represent the additional stream interconnections required by this mechanism.
Operator replicas send data to both operator copies downstream. Operators
deduplicate tuples when consuming data from redundant streams.
its counters when a punctuation activity fires. The deduplication logic works
for both tainted and non-tainted stream connections. Note that deduplicat-
ing tuples exclusively by counters adds a little imprecision to our model. The
imprecision also comes from the fact that SANs are non-deterministic. This
means that although the operators are semantically replicas, the outcome of
the activities that represents their selectivity (Figure 5.1) can be different
even if they are processing a tuple with the same count value. We envision
that operator replicas can be made deterministic by starting the pseudoran-
dom number generator associated to each processing activity with the same
seed. In addition, we can extend the model so that a token can be handled
as a data structure containing a sequence number. The sequence numbers
can then be used for a precise deduplication.
Since this technique guarantees no data loss and no data duplication un-
der crashes, we consider its evaluation only under SDC errors. The error
propagation model follows the rules described in Section 5.4.2. For the sta-
bilization time of a stateful operator after a fault or error propagation, we
follow a similar formula to that introduced for the checkpointing technique.
If a stateful operator receives a tainted tuple or a fault affects its internal
state, we assume its stabilization time is proportional to the state size.
5.6 Evaluation
To illustrate the applicability of the proposed framework, this section reports
on evaluating the dependability of a real streaming application while employ-
ing different fault tolerance techniques. Our first experiment compares the
fault tolerance provided to the same application when crashes occur and the
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following techniques are applied: checkpointing of stateful operators (Table
5.1 - configuration 1) and HA groups with checkpointing (Table 5.1 - con-
figuration 2). The second experiment evaluates the impact of SDC in the
output of the application when full replication is deployed (configuration 3
in Table 5.2). All our models and experiments were implemented with the
Mo¨bius tool and its simulator [102].
Table 5.1: First experiment compares configuration 1 to configuration 2 un-
der the same fault model. Configuration 1 deploys the bargain discovery
application with two stateful operators configured to checkpoint. Configura-
tion 2 deploys the same application, but applies the HA groups technique to
two different operator groups, and checkpointing of one operator.
Configuration 1 Configuration 2
Application
graph
f(x)  f(x)
f(x)
f(x)

2
f(x)2
f( )
f(x)2 f(x)2
f( )
f(x)
1
f(x)1
x 1 x 1
f(x)  f(x)
f(x)
f(x)

2
f(x)2
f( )
f(x)2 f(x)2
f( )
f(x)
1
f(x)1
x 1 x 1
Fault tolerance checkpoint [27] HA groups and checkpoint [27]
Fault model crash leading to data loss crash leading to data loss
Table 5.2: Second experiment evaluates configuration 3 under SDC errors.
Configuration 3 applies the full replication mechanism to the bargain discov-
ery application.
Configuration 3
Application
graph
2f(x)2 f(x)2
1
f(x)2
f( )
f(x)1 f(x)1
2
x 1 1
f(x)
f(x)1
1
2
Fault tolerance full replication [22]
Fault model silent data corruption
5.6.1 Target Application
Our target application is bargain discovery [4], which aims at processing
financial market trades and quotes to discover stocks that have a low price
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at a certain point in time. This application has eight stream operators, and
its original processing graph is shown in Table 5.1 - configuration 1. The
stream operators include four filters, one aggregate, and a join. Both the
aggregate and join operators process data over count-based windows. These
operators instantiate new windows according to the stock symbols contained
in the incoming data stream (Spade’s per-group modifier).
5.6.2 Experiment Parameters
In our experiments, we used a constant input stream data rate with the
following values: 250, 350, 450, and 550 tuples/second. Our values were
based on real market data from December 2005, which has an average rate
of 500 tuples/second. The average tuple processing time and selectivity for
each operator in the graph are shown in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Parameters used in the bargain discovery model. Processing time
(in seconds) and selectivity obtained via Spade profiler. State size (in tuples)
obtained from the application code and trace data.
Operator Processing time (seconds) Selectivity State size (tuples)
Source 1.26E–06 1.0 0
Filter 1 1.26E–06 1.0 0
Filter 2 5.29E–07 0.2 0
Aggregate 1.32E–05 1.0 15,495
Filter 3 5.47E–07 1.0 0
Filter 4 2.25E–07 0.8 0
Join (port 1) 1.27E–06 0.0 3099
Join (port 2) 1.27E–06 0.182 0
Sink 7.43E–07 1.0 0
As described in Section 5.4, the selectivity of an operator can change (if
lower than 1) when processing tainted tuples. We considered a variation of
selectivity of 10% for stateful operators and 5% for stateless operators. These
variations are based on data from our fault injection experiments, where we
compared the number of tuples produced during a fault-free application run
and a run under faults.
96
5.6.3 Evaluation Metrics
Our evaluation metrics are the following:
1. Availability. The application is available when all of its operators (or
one of its replicas) are alive and stable, no operator is processing tainted
tuples, and no operator has a tainted state. This metric considers the
fraction of time that the application is providing correct service [103].
2. Total number of tainted tuples. This metric considers the total number
of tainted tuples stored by the sink operator. It gives an estimate of
how many tuples can have its attribute values affected by a fault.
3. Percentage of tainted tuples with respect to fault-free run. This metric is
the fraction of tainted tuples stored by the sink during a run with faults
over the total number of tuples stored by the sink during a fault-free
run. It indicates the fault impact on the total application output.
5.6.4 Checkpoint versus High-Availability Groups
In this first experiment, we used our modeling framework to compare the
impact of crash faults on the application when applying only checkpoint-
ing of stateful operators (configuration 1) and when adding two HA groups
(configuration 2). We used a simulation time of 2 hours, and each experi-
ment configuration had at least 1000 repetitions. The simulation stops after
all evaluation metrics reach an average result with a confidence level of 95%.
We simulated the models with the following exponential fault rates: 5.56E–04
(30 minutes), 3.33E–04 (50 minutes), 2.38E–04 (70 minutes), and 1.85E–04
(90 minutes). Stream operators fail at the same rate and independently. Al-
though these rates are high considering supercomputer failure rates [90], we
used such rates to project the impact of faults in the application in scenarios
where failures can be more frequent.
For the Aggregate operator, we considered a state penalty factor (Section
5.5) of 0.035 after a crash or an upstream failure and a state penalty factor of
0.005 when receiving tainted tuples in its inputs. In addition, we considered
an operator staleness factor of 1.98. The state penalty factor after a crash
and the staleness factor were obtained by using a sample input stream of the
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Aggregate operator and analyzing the tuples falling inside a window. The
window is obtained by selecting a random point of the input stream and by
assuming a given input rate and different recovery times. For each random
point of the input stream, we evaluate how many count-based windows (Sec-
tion 5.6.1) would be affected if data were to be dropped at that point. By
doing this operation 1000 times for each recovery time and input rate com-
bination, we obtain an average of how many windows are affected during a
fault. This indicates approximately how many tuples should be reprocessed
to fully recover the affected windows. We did this operation for the four
tested source input rate values (5.6.2) and with recovery times ranging from
1 second to 17 seconds. This values were used to find the parameters that
best fit the function introduced in Section 5.5 to the real data. Figure 5.10
shows the values obtained from the real data and the values obtained by
fitting function Z〈o〉,i under different input rates.
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Figure 5.10: Total number of tuples required to be processed after a crash
of the Aggregate operator: (a) input rates of 250 and 350 tuples/second;
and (b) input rates of 450 and 550 tuples/second. Graphs show the average
obtained from real data (Average) and the number obtained by the fitted
Z〈o〉,i function (Model).
A similar procedure was followed for the Join operator and its stateful port
(port 1). The value obtained for the state penalty factor after a crash is 0.03,
and the value obtained for the staleness factor is 0.41. Similarly to the Ag-
gregate, a state penalty factor of 0.005 was considered when receiving tainted
tuples in its inputs. Figure 5.11 shows the values obtained from experiments
with the real data and the fitted function Z〈o〉,i under different input rates.
Note that when compared to the Aggregate operator, the parameters for the
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Join operator are lower. This is due to the smaller internal state size of the
Join operator.
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Figure 5.11: Total number of tuples required to be processed after a crash of
the Join operator: (a) input rates of 250 and 350 tuples/second; and (b) input
rates of 450 and 550 tuples/second. Graphs show the average obtained from
real data (Average) and the number obtained by the fitted Z〈o〉,i function
(Model).
We assumed that all checkpointed operators had their latest checkpoint 1
second before the crash occurred. We also parameterized the state cap factor
as 1, which means a full window refresh. We evaluated both techniques
considering a crash recovery time of 3.5 seconds and 15 seconds. These
numbers are based on the average and worst case times for restarting an
operator in System S. For the HA groups technique, we considered a failover
time between replicas of 1 second, which is the average failover time of our
implementation in Spade.
Figure 5.12 shows how the evaluation metrics behave when the source
input rate increases. Figure 5.12(a) shows that as the input rate increases,
the availability also increases. When the input rate is higher, the operator
windows can be refilled more quickly, resulting in a lower stabilization time.
Even though the availability is higher for increased input rates, Figure 5.12(b)
shows that the number of tainted tuples also increases. This behavior occurs
because of the Join operator. Although the operator state stabilizes more
quickly, the Join operator also correlates more data from one of its input
streams when its state is tainted, leading to a greater number of tainted
tuples on the output.
Another observation from Figures 5.12(a) and 5.12(b) is that the deploy-
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Figure 5.12: Results for configuration 1 and configuration 2 for crash faults
with an exponential rate of 1.85E–04. Graphs include numbers for crash
recovery times of 3.5 and 15 seconds. The legend of Figure 5.12(a) applies for
Figures 5.12(b) and 5.12(c). Figure 5.12(a) shows that availability increases
as the input rate increases for both techniques. The number of tainted tuples
produced increases when source input rates are higher (Figure 5.12(b)), but
its fraction decreases when compared to the total number of tuples produced
by the application.
ment with HA groups is better than checkpointing even for a recovery time of
15 seconds. Although the availability provided by this technique is slightly
lower when compared to configuration 1 with 3.5 seconds of recovery, the
number of tainted tuples is significantly lower. This occurs because when
the non-replicated operators fail, no output is produced by the application,
reducing the number of tainted tuples. When other operators of the graph
fail, there is a spare copy, leading to a quicker recovery. Note that when the
input rate is higher (550 tuples/second), the availability provided by the HA
groups approach is higher than the checkpoint approach even if the operator
recovery time is 15 seconds. We believe this occurs because the Aggregate is
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the operator with highest the stabilization time. Even though the Aggregate
takes a longer to stabilize after a crash when under the HA group approach
(because it recovers from scratch), it stabilizes faster due to the higher input
rate. As a result, if there is a failover to an unstable replica, the unstable
time is smaller than the recovery time of 3.5 seconds and the stabilization
time after recovering from a checkpoint. In Figure 5.12(c), we can see that
the number of tainted tuples in relation to the total number of tuples pro-
duced by the application decreases. A fault tolerance technique that affects
only a minor fraction of the output might be sufficient for a given target
application.
Figure 5.13 shows the impact of different fault rates on the application
availability. The tested scenario includes configurations 1 and 2. As ex-
pected, we can see that as the fault rate increases, the availability of the
application decreases. When comparing configurations 1 and 2, we can see
that the difference in availability is low (at most 0.009) if the extra com-
puting resources required to deploy the HA groups technique are considered.
On the other hand, this technique can pay off if we consider the number of
erroneous tuples produced because of the faults. In the scenario with fault
rate 5.56E–04, configuration 2 generates approximately half the number of
tainted tuples generated by configuration 1. Figure 5.13 also shows the avail-
ability of the application when our availability metric does not consider fault
propagation. We can see that the application availability is overestimated,
providing an unrealistic number to the developer.
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Figure 5.13: Results for configuration 1 and configuration 2 under crash
faults occurring at different fault rates. Displayed availability is for a source
input rate of 450 tuples/second and crash recovery time of 3.5 seconds.
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5.6.5 Impact of Silent Data Corruption
In this experiment, we tested the impact of SDCs when bargain discovery
uses a full replication technique (configuration 3 in Table 5.2). For this
scenario, the SDC rates follow an exponential distribution with λs values of
1.52E–04 (110 minutes) and 1.39E–04 (120 minutes). When the fault triggers
in stateful operators, it corrupts a single tuple or its internal state with
50% chance each (i.e., equal chance of corruption before or after processing
a tuple). The stabilization time assumed for this scenario is the same as
for propagated errors in the previous experiment. We used a punctuation
interval of 15 seconds. Once a punctuation arrives, the model clears the
counters for both clean and tainted tuples.
Figure 5.14(a) shows the availability under different input rates and dif-
ferent fault rates (1.52E–04 and 1.39E–04). Similarly to experiments with
crash faults, as the source input rate increases, the availability increases. In-
tuitively, the availability also decreases as the fault rate increases. Note that
the impact of the availability of SDC is much lower than crash faults. The
reasons are (i) the assumed fault rate is lower, (ii) operators never go oﬄine
due to a fault, and (iii) the application produces tainted tuples only via er-
ror propagation, which has a lower stabilization time. Figure 5.14(b) shows
the percentage of tainted tuples in the application output. We can see that
the number of tainted tuples is very low if compared to the total number of
tuples produced by the application in a fault-free run (less than 300 tainted
tuples in our experiments). However, the total number of tuples produced
by the application (tainted tuples + non-tainted tuples) is greater than the
total number of tuples (and its confidence interval) produced during a fault-
free run. This indicates that SDC breaks the no data duplication guarantee
provided by the full replication technique. This means that stream operator
developers should consider high coverage but low-cost fault detectors if no
data duplication should be guaranteed. We believe this is a problem that
should be studied given the high processing rates and low latency require-
ments of stream processing systems.
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Figure 5.14: (a) Availability for a full replication deployment under SDC
(configuration 3). The availability increases as input rate increases. (b)
Percentage of tainted tuples under the same fault tolerance technique. The
relative impact of error decreases as tuple rate increases.
5.7 Model Validation
Model validation is a critical step for obtaining trustworthy results. Our
first validation test is to assess the similarity between the performance of an
application running on top of System S and running the application model
in our framework. Figure 5.15 shows the result of our experiment, where we
plot the number of output tuples produced by the application sink over time.
The output rate in the real execution is more unstable when compared to the
one produced by the model. This occurs because the operator selectivities
vary within a range over time according to the data distribution, while our
model captures the average selectivity. Note, however, that once the real
application fills up its internal windows, the average output rates seen by
the sink are similar to the ones produced by a single execution of our model
(60.03 and 65.78 tuples/second, respectively). In future work, we plan to
increment our base model to better capture the possible dynamics of the
stream data.
To validate our fault and error propagation model, we compared the re-
sults of the bargain discovery model with the results obtained by injecting
faults into the same application in System S. We exercised the model by
forcing the occurrence of a single crash fault on one operator, imitating the
injection methodology proposed in Chapter 4. Table 5.4 shows our measure-
ments when faults are injected into different operators. The crash recovery
time and source input rate considered for both real and simulated execu-
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Figure 5.15: Comparison of bargain discovery executing on top of System S
and its simulation in our framework. After the application stream operators
fill up its internal windows, the average output rate observed in the real sink
is similar to the one produced by our model.
tions are the same (16 seconds and 2200 tuples/second). The table shows
the measurements of the availability and the recovery time (Rlq) metrics. In
short, the Rlq metric assesses how long, after the injection of a fault, the
application takes to produce results that are approximate to a fault-free run.
Although the two metrics do not measure the same thing, we can say that
Rlq is an indirect metric of the application availability (i.e., the greater the
Rlq, the lower the availability). We can see that the relative order of the
operators’ availability is the same, excepting the Aggregate operator. This
occurs because in the model we consider that the checkpoint of the Aggre-
gate operator is taken 1 second before the crash, and in the real injections we
consider that its checkpoint is taken immediately before the crash. The table
also shows the measurements for the number of tainted tuples and the qual-
ity impact (I lq) metrics. Briefly, the I lq metric computes the sum of squares
of the differences between the tuple attribute values of a faulty run and a
fault-free run. We can say that the greater the number of tainted tuples,
the greater the value of I lq. However, because the number of tainted tuples
does not capture the error magnitude that I lq captures, there might be some
discrepancy. This is the case for the Filter 3 operator, which has a higher I lq
value than Source, but produces a smaller number of tainted tuples on the
application output. The similarity between our measurements confirms the
accuracy of our model.
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Table 5.4: Comparison between results obtained from real fault injections
into bargain discovery (Section 4.5.3) and results obtained from our model.
Availability maps to the recovery time (Rlq) metric. Number of tainted tuples
maps to the quality impact (I lq) metric.
Operator Availability Rlq Tainted tuples I lq
Source 0.84533 340 15,506.32 21.23
Filter 1 0.84536 340 15,500.01 21.23
Filter 2 0.84533 340 21,752.34 48.7
Aggregate 0.83987 340 22,520.63 48.7
Filter 3 0.93676 73 8898.29 30.87
Filter 4 0.95555 6 0 6
Join 0.93599 43 2753.54 7.89
For validating the propagation model for SDC errors, we modified our
target application to include an extra attribute in the tuple schema. The
extra attribute indicates whether the tuple is corrupted. We then forced the
propagation of this attribute through all operators of the application (e.g., an
aggregate propagates the maximum value of the attribute value for all tuples
in its window). We observed that even when the source operator contains
only one corrupted tuple, it may result in the corruption of multiple tuples
in the output.
The validation of the fault tolerance mechanisms followed an approach
similar to the objectives of fault injection. By forcing the failure of operators
in the model, we can observe if the detection and recovery transitions are
taking place accordingly. Finally, we added multiple monitoring functions
that check for invariants of our model during its execution. By checking the
value of these assertions each time the model simulates, we confirm that the
model is operating as expected. One example of this assertion is that two
replicas of an HA group should never be active at the same time.
5.8 Model Limitations
As in any modeling approach, our modeling framework can provide only an
approximation of the system behavior. In this section, we discuss some of
the limitations of our approach.
1. Parametrization. In our experiments, we derived some of the param-
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eters based on previous fault injection observations and on the ap-
plication source code. However, for other applications that contain
operators with processing logic defined by the user (e.g., user-defined
operators in Spade), we may need to conduct fault injection experi-
ments to derive parameters such as the stabilization time. Although
fault injection is a time-consuming task, its results can be used for
multiple applications that use the same operator and for testing differ-
ent physical deployments (e.g., concurrent operator failures caused by
co-location in the same node).
2. Overtainting of tuples. Our assumption for stateful operators is that
during the stabilization time, all tuples produced are tainted. This
can cause overtainting of tuples for some operator types. One such
example is a join operator, where only some of the correlated tuples
may be tainted. As future work, we plan to create additional model
templates based on the operator semantics.
3. Simulation with high data rates. One of the key abstractions of our
model is the tuple representation, where each tuple is mapped to a
token in the SAN. When simulating the model, all these tokens have
to be processed and go through the processing graph, increasing the
execution time of the simulation. We believe that this problem can be
tackled by reducing the simulation time and the input rates, making
them proportional to the original stream source rate. By using such
techniques, the developer can still assess fault tolerance mechanisms
and derive insights with our framework. Another possible optimization
is to only produce tuples once a failed is triggered in the model or any of
the operators in the model is in unstable mode. With such optimization,
the time consumed by the simulator when the application is behaving
normally is much shorter.
5.9 Related Work
The evaluation of the impact of fault tolerance techniques in streaming ap-
plications has focused mostly on performance [65, 22, 19]. Other works have
focused on evaluating the impact of data loss in the application results via ex-
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perimentation [27, 21]. The work described in Chapter 4 focuses on proposing
a fault injection methodology to learn how to deploy partial fault tolerance
techniques. This work proposes the evaluation of the impact of faults on a
streaming application by providing generic and extensible models that con-
sider error propagation.
Zhao et al. [104] develop a modeling framework for fork/join tasks to
target the problem of optimal resource allocation. This work focuses on the
occurrence of faults and their effects on the application output.
Our work can also be compared to other uses of probabilistic models to
evaluate fault tolerant systems. Singh et al. [93] model publish/subscribe
systems to evaluate their survivability. Cinque et al. [92] model the depend-
ability of wireless sensor networks. Wang et al. [94] develop a model for eval-
uation of synchronous checkpointing of distributed applications considering
error propagation. Our modeling framework differs from these approaches
by providing abstractions tailored for streaming applications. Moreover, one
of the fundamental differences of our framework is that it combines the mod-
eling of application data and application state. By modeling the effects of
faults into the application data and its propagation throughout the applica-
tion, we can evaluate a target application in terms of the impact of the fault
on its output.
Previous research has analyzed the effects of error propagation in software
[105, 106]. These works consider the effect of data corruption errors. We also
consider how data loss can affect other components of the processing graph.
5.10 Summary
This chapter described a modeling framework tailored to evaluate the de-
pendability of streaming applications under faults. Our framework provides
abstractions for three key components of an application: stream operators,
stream connections, and tuples. By assembling these components, we can
compose a given application and evaluate how it behaves under faulty condi-
tions. Our framework can be used to evaluate different fault tolerance tech-
niques and test new techniques even before implementing them in a streaming
middleware.
We show the generality and extensibility of our framework by modeling
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three different fault tolerance mechanisms. The framework showed that high-
availability groups has a great advantage over checkpointing, mainly when the
fault detection and recovery time is long. In addition, the results show that
SDC can break the no data duplication guarantee provided by a full graph
replication-based technique [22]. This result motivates the development of
low-cost error detectors tailored for streaming applications.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation describes methods for providing partial fault tolerance for
stream processing applications. Contrasting with current designs, these
methods do not enforce a one-size-fits-all approach. We propose a check-
pointing and partial graph replication scheme that can be selectively applied
to the stream processing graph. As a result, the application developer can
configure a solution that is ideal for a given application, achieving better per-
formance and lower resource consumption. Our solutions were implemented
in IBM Research’s middleware for stream computing System S and partly
integrated into IBM’s InfoSphere Streams Version 1.2 [33, 35]. The fault tol-
erance feature has been used by real applications, such as applications that
process live call data records.
In addition, this dissertation focuses on evaluation methods for under-
standing the impact of faults in a given streaming application. Our first
approach is experimental and is based on the emulation of the effect of faults
in each stream operator of the processing graph. By analyzing the impact
of these faults on the application output, we characterize each operator with
a set of evaluation metrics. These metrics can be then used to estimate
the sensitivity of each stream operator to faults. The most sensitive opera-
tors should be given priority when partially protecting the stream processing
graph. Our experiments with a financial engineering application show that
the influence of an operator output stream on the state of the downstream
flow graph determines the criticality of the operator.
Our second fault tolerance evaluation approach is based on modeling. This
approach allows the comparison of the dependability provided by different
fault tolerance techniques and under varying fault models. The framework
offers abstractions tailored for the stream processing domain, namely stream
operators, stream connections, and tuples. These abstractions are assembled
to compose a complete streaming application. The proposed framework con-
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siders the effects of error propagation, which allows a more precise estimate of
the availability provided by a given fault tolerance technique and the mecha-
nism by which faults can affect the application output. Our results show that
partial graph replication has a great advantage in maintaining the accuracy
of the application output when compared with checkpointing, mainly when
we consider that the system can take a long time to recover failed stream
operators. In addition, our framework revealed that silent data corruption
can break the no duplication guarantee of a full replication technique [22].
6.1 Lessons Learned
Some of the lessons learned throughout the development of this dissertation
include the following.
1. Fault tolerance techniques should cope with application non-
determinism to give flexibility to the application developer and maxi-
mize application throughput. The fault tolerance mechanisms proposed
in this dissertation account for non-determinism, and do not enforce
replicas of stream operators to process incoming data in the same or-
der or generate the same output every time. As a result, our techniques
allow the application developer to implement a stream operator with
a tuple processing function with any logic. Spade is an example of
stream processing language that allows developers to define their own
operator processing logic. Developers can devise multi-threaded oper-
ators and use any operating system call and legacy libraries. Enforcing
determinism limits which kinds of functions the developer can use (e.g.,
functions that return wall clock time). In addition, enforcing determin-
ism among replicas can have a very high cost [107] and may lead to the
violation of the application throughput requirement.
2. Partial fault tolerance may be essential when considering streaming ap-
plications with real-time constraints. In real-time systems, the applica-
tion is considered to have failed if it produces an output after a given
deadline. Fault tolerance methods with high performance overhead
may cause messages being processed by the application to be delayed,
even without any stream operator crash. The evaluation techniques
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described in this dissertation can help a developer to find parts of the
application where fault tolerance is not needed. This results in reduced
performance overhead and, as a result, a lower number of messages with
missed deadlines.
3. Evaluation techniques need to consider large-scale applications. The ex-
perimental evaluation technique described in Chapter 4 characterizes
the impact of stream operators on the application output by injecting
faults into each operator individually. However, the the total number of
stream operators in an application can be large (i.e., hundreds), which
can affect the scalability of our technique. In Section 4.3.2, we propose
placement rules to reduce the number of required fault injection exper-
iments when considering a tuple loss fault model. Similar placement
rules can be developed for other fault models. When considering the
model-based evaluation approach, we use SAN simulation to compare
different fault tolerance techniques. In this case, the greater number of
stream operators in an application, the longer the simulation time is.
However, the simulation of our model can be trivially parallelized. This
is because different stream operator models can be placed in different
nodes or threads, and only input and output stream connection places
and operator liveness state values need to be shared between distinct
nodes.
6.2 Future Work
This research opens many opportunities for future work, both in terms of de-
veloping new partial fault tolerance techniques and exploring new approaches
to evaluate its efficacy. A few of opportunities are itemized below.
• Our current fault tolerance techniques can cause a bursty tuple loss
in the stream being processed by a given operator. One opportunity
to improve this technique is to consider the partial buffering of tuples
when operators crash. Instead of backing up outgoing tuples in all
upstream operators [65], we can randomly discard some tuples in order
to decrease the number of data items replayed after a crash. This can
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improve accuracy if compared to a bursty tuple loss, but still reduce
the recovery time if compared to an upstream backup approach.
• Another approach to improve accuracy in our partial graph replication
approach is by developing smart replica failover algorithms. Because
the state of the replicas can diverge as a result of the possible non-
determinism of operators, the failover algorithm has to be smart in
order to reduce the number of duplicated or omitted tuples.
• The current version of our fault injection tool (Chapter 4) supports
the emulation of a bursty tuple loss fault model. Other models that
can be implemented include tuple duplication, tuple reordering, repli-
cated tuples with divergent attribute values, and corruption of attribute
values. Additional fault models allow the observation of the applica-
tion behavior under different situations. Such observations are critical
to the development of new protection techniques, since they indicate
what behavior should be enforced upon the occurrence of a fault.
• The outcome of our experimental methodology approach is in terms of
four evaluation metrics that characterize each stream operator in the
processing graph. The current approach to improve the application
fault tolerance is to greedily protect the operators with higher mea-
surements of the quality impact and recovery time metrics. However,
protecting all operators with high metric values can still break the per-
formance requirements of the application. A venue for future work is
to formulate an optimization problem, whose objective is to find the
best fault tolerance deployment for a given application, so that it still
meets the performance constraints but minimizes the output quality
degradation.
• In the current version of the modeling framework, the application com-
position and the generation of base operator models are done manually
according to the algorithms described in Chapter 5. This process can
be automated by developing a tool that interprets the streaming appli-
cation source code and derives the required information (e.g., number
of operators, input and output ports, stream connections). In addi-
tion, this tool can provide a standard interface that allows new fault
tolerance techniques to be plugged into the model.
112
• The results presented in this dissertation assume that operators fail
independently. However, operators can be co-located in the same pro-
cess of the operating system or run in different processes of the same
computing node to achieve lower processing latency [28, 42, 55]. The
current version of the framework can be modified to consider the physi-
cal deployment of the application and analyze the application behavior
in such situations.
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Appendix A
STOCHASTIC ACTIVITY NETWORK
MODELS FOR DIFFERENT STREAM
OPERATOR TYPES
This appendix shows the equivalent SAN model for different built-in stream
operator types contained in the Spade language [28, 35]. The models de-
scribed here follow the algorithm described in Section 5.2.1. In addition, the
chapter reports how the framework models the propagation of punctuation
marks. For the sake of simplicity, the figures shown in this appendix do not
include the propagation of tainted tokens.
A.1 Source Operator
The source operator brings data to the application from an external data
source. Figure A.1 gives an example of a source operator coded in Spade.
This operator processes incoming data from host some.node.com and sends
the data to its output. The stream operator has a single output port, which
is represented by the keyword stream and is named as SomeSourceStream.
stream SomeSourceStream(id: String, attr1: String, attr2: String)
:= Source()
["ctcp://some.node.com:2210/"]
{}
Figure A.1: Source operator code.
Figure A.2 shows the equivalent SAN model for the source operator shown
in Figure A.1. Note that the source operator includes an input gate (IG3)
and an activity directly connected to the input stream connection place. The
input gate enables the activity whenever there is space in the input buffers
of the operator, which is represented by the input stream connection place.
A token is added to the input stream connection place once the activity fires.
The semantic of a source operator indicates that the the operator should
forward all messages it receives, i.e., the operator selectivity is 1.0. This
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Figure A.2: SAN model for source operator.
means that the probability assigned to the transition from the processing
stage to the waiting stage is 0.0.
A.2 Sink Operator
The sink operator externalizes the result stream of a streaming application.
The output of this operator is sent to an external system component (e.g., a
file, a database, or a GUI). Figure A.3 gives an example of a sink operator
coded in Spade. This sink operator receives as input the SomeSourceStream
and stores its tuples into a file named (appResult.dat).
Nil
:= Sink(SomeSourceStream)
["file:////appResult.dat", csvFormat]
{}
Figure A.3: Sink operator code.
Figure A.4 shows the SAN model generated by our modeling framework
for a sink operator. The model is similar to the source operator model.
Note that the sink operator does not have an activity connected to its input
stream connection place. This is because the sink operator receives data from
another operator in the processing graph, which, in this case, is an operator
generating the SomeSourceStream. In addition, a sink operator does not
have an output stream connection place. The place named application output
stores all tokens generated by the model.
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Figure A.4: SAN model for sink operator.
A.3 Functor Operator
A functor operator can filter, project, and transform attribute values of an in-
coming tuple. Figure A.5 gives an example of a functor that filters the tuples
from the incoming streams (SomeSourceStream, AnotherSourceStream, and
YetAnotherStream) based on the id attribute value. All tuples that con-
tain the attribute id with value "AString" are sent forward. All others get
discarded. Figure A.6 gives a functor with a different functionality. The
operator consumes data from the same three streams. Instead of filtering
tuples, it adds a timestamp attribute to the stream.
stream AStringStream(attr1: String, attr2: String)
:= Functor(SomeSourceStream,AnotherSourceStream,
YetAnotherStream)
[id="AString"]
{}
Figure A.5: Functor operator with filtering function.
stream TimestampedStream(timestamp:Long,
schemaFor(SomeSourceStream))
:= Functor(SomeSourceStream,AnotherSourceStream,
YetAnotherStream)
[]
{timestamp := timeMicroseconds()}
Figure A.6: Functor operator with transformation function.
Figure A.7 shows the SAN model generated by the framework for both
functors (Figures A.5 and A.6). Each input stream connection place maps
to one input stream represented in the source code. Note that although the
two functors have different functionality, their corresponding SAN model is
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the same. This is because their structure (i.e., number of I/O ports and
number of I/O stream connections) is the same. The only change between
the two functors is the case probability values assigned to the activity that
represents the operator selectivity. While the functor in Figure A.6 has a
selectivity of 1.0 (i.e., no tuple is discarded), the functor in Figure A.5 can
have a selectivity lower than 1.0 (i.e., some tuples may be discarded due to
the operator predicate).
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Figure A.7: SAN model for functor operator.
A.4 Aggregate Operator
An aggregate applies functions over a window (i.e., a collection) of tuples.
The developer can configure the how this window accumulates tuples. The
window can contain a specific number of tuples (i.e., count-based) or collect
all tuples received over a period of time (i.e., time-based). Figure A.8 shows
an example of a count-based aggregate. In this example, the operator main-
tains the 20 most recent incoming tuples (count(20)). Figure A.9 shows
an example of a time-based aggregate. Only tuples received in the last 15
seconds (time(15)) are maintained.
The aggregate operator also has a triggering policy, which defines when
the operator should compute the aggregation function and emit a tuple in
its output port. One possible triggering policy is to generate an output
tuple after a specific number of tuples are received. In the code displayed
in Figure A.8, the operator generates an output every time a new tuple is
received (count(1)). Another triggering policy is to generate an output
tuple based on a time interval. Figure A.9 shows an example where a tuple
is emitted at every 2 seconds (time(2)).
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stream MaxIntStream(max:Integer)
:= Aggregate(IntegerStream <count(20),count(1)>)
[]
{max := Max(intValue)}
Figure A.8: Aggregate with count-based triggering policy.
stream CountAStringStream(count:Integer)
:= Aggregate(AStringStream <time(15),time(2)>)
[]
{count := Cnt()}
Figure A.9: Aggregate with time-based triggering policy.
Figure A.10 shows the equivalent SAN model for the aggregate with count-
based triggering policy. Because the triggering policy for this aggregate is to
emit a tuple at every new incoming tuple, the model should have its selectivity
parameterized to 1.0. Note that this selectivity parameter does not need to
be derived from the code itself. The parameter can be obtained by profiling
the application, as discussed in Section 5.2.
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Figure A.10: SAN model for aggregate with count-based triggering policy.
Figure A.11 shows the SAN model for the aggregate coded in Figure A.9.
To emulate the triggering of an output based on time, the model includes
a phony input port. This input port is represented by the input stream
connection place labeled time trigger. Based on the time interval specified
in the application code, this input stream connection receives a new token
that is processed by the operator. When this token is processed, the operator
produces an output (selectivity of 1.0). All other incoming tokens from the
original input stream connection are discarded (selectivity of 0.0). Note
that the behavior of this operator could also be approximated by observing
the profile of the application. Adding a time trigger allows a more precise
modeling of the time-based behavior, since it copes with the possibly different
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incoming data rates of upstream operators.
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Figure A.11: SAN model for aggregate with time-based triggering policy.
A.5 Join Operator
The join operator correlates streams associated to two different ports ac-
cording to a predicate condition. Similarly to an aggregate, the join operator
looks for correlations based on the contents of a window. This operator only
triggers correlations upon the arrival of new tuples. More details on the join
operator logic can be found in Section 3.2.4.
Figure A.12 gives an example of a join operator where tuples coming from
Stream1 and Stream2 are correlated with tuples from Stream3 according to
an equality predicate. Stream1 and Stream2 are associated to the first input
port, while Stream3 is associated to the second input port. The operator
maintains a window of 30 tuples (count(30)) for both ports.
stream CorrelatedStream(id:Integer, attr1:String, attr2:String)
:= Join(Stream1,Stream2 <count(30)>;
Stream3 <count(30)>)
[{$1.id = $2.id}]
{id := $1.id, attr1 := $1.attr, attr2 := $2.attr}
Figure A.12: Join operator code.
Figure A.13 shows the equivalent SAN model for the join operator coded
in Figure A.12. The three input streams are represented by the three input
places tagged as input stream connections. The two processing tuple places
represent the two input ports of the join operator. Although the join has two
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input ports, it has only one output port (CorrelatedStream). In the model,
this is represented by a single sending output place.
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Figure A.13: SAN model for join operator.
A.6 Sort Operator
The sort operator arranges the tuples contained in a window according to
the specified ordering configuration (ascending or descending). Figure A.14
gives an example of a sort operator with a time-based window of 20 seconds
(time(20)). Once the operator sorts all tuples accumulated over a 20 second
interval, it sends all of them to the operator output. After that, it sends a
punctuation to mark the end of a window.
stream SortedStream(max:Integer)
:= (IntegerStream <time(20)>)
[intValue(asc)]
{}
Figure A.14: Sort operator with time-based window.
Figure A.15 shows the model for the sort operator in Figure A.14. Sim-
ilarly to the time-based aggregate, the model includes a phony input port
to trigger the punctuation mark once the window ends. The emulation of
a punctuation mark can be done through a phony output port. All tokens
sent through this port are considered punctuation marks and should be pro-
cessed by an equivalent phony input port on downstream operators. Note
that this model does not buffer all tuples before sending them to operators
downstream. A model that considers tuple buffering can be achieved with
minor modifications to the processing stage.
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Figure A.15: SAN model for sort operator with time-based window.
A.7 Barrier Operator
The barrier operator synchronizes multiple streams that are logically related.
Once the operator receives at least one tuple in each input port, it emits a
new tuple. Figure A.16 gives an example of code for a barrier operator. This
example shows the synchronization of tuples from Stream1 and Stream2 with
tuples from Stream3.
stream SyncStream(id1:Integer, attr1:String, attr2:String)
:= Barrier(Stream1,Stream2; Stream3)
[]
{id1 := $1.id, attr1 := $1.attr, attr2 := $2.attr}
Figure A.16: Barrier operator code.
The equivalent SAN model for this operator is identical to the one shown
in Figure A.13. This model is an approximation of a barrier. A more precise
barrier model can be made with minor changes to the base model.
A.8 Punctor Operator
A punctor operator inserts a punctuation mark in a stream once a given
predicate evaluates to true. Figure A.17 gives an example of an operator
that inserts a punctuation mark after it receives a tuple where the value of
attribute id is greater than 100.
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stream PunctuatedStream(id:Integer, attr:String)
:= Punctor(Stream1)
[id > 100, after]
{}
Figure A.17: Punctor operator code.
Figure A.18 shows the SAN model for the punctor operator coded in Fig-
ure A.17. The processing stage activity of a punctor has an additional case
probability associated with it. While the first two cases represent the prob-
ability of discarding a tuple and the probability of sending a tuple to the
operator output port, the third case represents the probability of emitting
a punctuation mark. If this case is taken, the operator sends a regular tu-
ple through its output stream connection and an extra tuple through the
punctuation output stream connection.
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Figure A.18: SAN model for punctor operator.
A.9 Split Operator
The split operator allows an input stream to be divided into multiple streams
according to a specified mapping. Figure A.19 gives an example of a split
operator where Stream1 is split into three other streams (Attr1Stream,
Attr2Stream and Attr3Stream) according the mapping defined in the file
map.txt. Each output stream maps to one output port.
Figure A.20 shows the SAN model for the split operator given in Fig-
ure A.19. This model includes three different output stream connections,
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stream Attr1Stream(id:Integer, attr1: String, attr2: String)
stream Attr2Stream(id:Integer, attr1: String, attr2: String)
stream Attr3Stream(id:Integer, attr1: String, attr2: String)
:= Split(Stream1)
["file:///map.txt", attr1]
{}
Figure A.19: Split operator code.
where each of them is associated to one output port. The probability of
writing a tuple to each output port is represented by the cases associated to
the processing activity.
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Figure A.20: SAN model for split operator.
A.10 Delay Operator
The delay operator forces a given delay for each incoming tuple. Figure A.21
gives an example of a delay operator where each tuple is delayed for 2 seconds.
stream DelayedStream(id:Integer, attr1: String, attr2: String)
:= Delay(Stream1)
[2.0]
{}
Figure A.21: Delay operator code.
The model of this operator is the same as the aggregate shown in Fig-
ure A.10. The activities of the model can be parameterized with the average
123
time to emit a tuple, as in the other operators. As described in Section 5.2,
such parameters can be obtained by profiling the application.
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